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Preface
Over the past few years there has been a growing consensus among policy 
makers that reforming the 61 year old welfare program—Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC)—is essential. The recent enactment of the Per 
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Act of 1996 is the outcome of 
this widespread concern. The new law replaces AFDC, a federal entitlement 
program, and its companion education, work, and training programs (JOBS) 
with a system of block grants to states; and it gives the states considerably 
more discretion over the design and operation of their programs than was the 
case under the AFDC program. The goal of the legislation is to break the cycle 
of dependency by both encouraging those already on welfare to find jobs and 
by discouraging those not yet on welfare from coming on the program.
This monograph, Lessons for Welfare Reform: An Analysis of the AFDC 
Caseload and Past Welfare-to-work Programs, provides policy makers with 
research results relating to historical trends in the AFDC caseload, the per 
sonal characteristics and patterns of welfare participation in a nationally repre 
sentative sample of young women followed over a thirteen-year period, and an 
evaluative survey of the effectiveness of past education, training, and workfare 
programs in reducing the AFDC caseload. These research results should be 
helpful to the states as they plan and begin the implementation of the new leg 
islation. For example, how many recipients can be expected to become inde 
pendent on their own before reaching the five-year time limit imposed by the 
new legislation? And what are the characteristics and realistic labor market 
options of those who still will be welfare-dependent at the five-year limit? 
How helpful are work/training programs likely to be in reducing welfare 
dependency? How will current and potential recipients react to a general 
reduction in the financial benefits available from welfare? Will teenage out-of- 
wedlock childbearing fall along with a decline in the incidence of welfare par 
ticipation among young women?
This project was commissioned in 1992 by the former National Commis 
sion on Employment Policy (NCEP), and it was completed in 1994. The 
research was conducted while the authors were at the Center for the Study of 
Business and Government at Baruch College of the City University of New 
York. June O'Neill, at the time, was director of the Center and Professor of 
Economics and Finance at Baruch College. Since March 1995, she has been 
on leave as director of the Congressional Budget Office. David O'Neill is cur 
rently a senior research associate at the Nathan Kline Institute for Psychiatric 
Research in Orangeburg, New York.
The project was originally designed to inform the potential implementation 
of a welfare reform policy that included a time limit on benefits. As it turned 
out, the new legislation features such a time limit. The report has been updated 
to include a description of the new law.
The authors would like to thank Neil Zanc for comments on early stages of 
the study, Carol Romero and Janet Johnston, also on the staff of the former 
NCEP, for their detailed review and helpful comments on drafts of this report, 
as well as an anonymous reviewer for the Upjohn Institute who provided valu 
able advice. The authors gratefully acknowledge the expert programming and 
research assistance of Wenhui Li.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The growth of the U.S. welfare system has generated many con 
cerns, but perhaps the major one is that welfare receipt can turn into 
long-term welfare dependency with detrimental consequences for both 
the adult recipients and their children. Although Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC), our welfare program for six decades, has 
functioned as a temporary helping hand for many families, a significant 
minority of these families have remained on the program for many 
years. Increasingly, the welfare caseload has been composed of women 
who have borne their first child while unmarried teenagers. These 
women are particularly vulnerable to becoming long-term welfare 
recipients.
Prompted by these concerns and by mounting criticism of the AFDC 
program, welfare reform became a prominent national issue. On 
August 22, 1996, federal legislation was enacted that terminates AFDC 
and replaces it with a new and significantly different program: the Per 
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(H.R. 3734-PL 104-193). 1
The new law draws on many reform innovations that were recently 
initiated at the state level. For more than a decade, an increasing num 
ber of states have conducted demonstration experiments and intro 
duced more permanent reforms under waivers granted by the federal 
government. Those waivers have allowed states to implement changes 
in their welfare programs that would not otherwise have been permit 
ted under the legislation governing the AFDC program.
The .primary goal of the state initiatives has been to reduce depen 
dency by promoting incentives to leave welfare or by discouraging 
going on in the first place. However, the programmatic approach to 
meeting this goal has shifted over time. The welfare reform efforts of 
earlier years focused largely on the development of employment and
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training programs that aimed to increase the potential earnings of wel 
fare recipients. More recent efforts, however, began to tackle, the other 
side of the equation through initiatives that would make benefits less 
generous and regulations more restrictive. Such initiatives have 
included limits on the number of years a family could receive welfare 
benefits and stricter work requirements for adults during periods of 
welfare receipt.
The new welfare legislation shifts considerable authority and power 
over welfare spending to the states. Under the old AFDC program, all 
eligible adults and children were guaranteed benefits (although the 
states determined the size of the benefits). This arrangement entitled 
the states to receive automatic and unlimited reimbursements from the 
federal government based on a formula (varying by state) that matched 
federal dollars to state spending on eligible AFDC recipients. Under 
the new legislation, the federal government instead will provide the 
state with lump-sum payments—block grants for Temporary Assis 
tance to Needy Families (TANF). In addition to AFDC cash benefits, 
TANF funds would replace other welfare programs: Emergency Assis 
tance, the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training Program (JOBS) 
and child care funding for AFDC recipients and certain other low- 
income families. Federal funding for the new block grants is set at 
$16.4 billion annually through 2002. This is approximately equal to the 
1995 combined level of federal funding on all of the commitments 
listed above.
Federal grants to the individual states are based on their recent 
spending on AFDC and JOBS. Supplemental federal grants are avail 
able under special circumstances, such as above-average population 
growth or high and rising levels of unemployment. A maintenance-of- 
effort provision requires each state to spend its own funds at 75 percent 
of what it spent in 1994 on the replaced programs.
The states are given broad authority to determine conditions of eligi 
bility for TANF grants. However, the law does mandate that all states 
set certain new conditions, including several provisions adopted by 
individual states under waivers. Of particular importance is the imposi 
tion of a lifetime limit of 60 months for receipt of TANF benefits. In 
addition, adult recipients will be required to fulfill a work requirement 
after a maximum of two years of benefits. Participants must spend at 
least 20 hours a week in an approved work activity up to 1999, with the
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hours requirement rising to 30 hours in the year 2000 and after. States 
are required to enroll 25 percent of their caseload in work activities by 
1997, rising to 50 percent by 2002. (Higher participation rates are 
required for two-parent families.) Among other restrictions, unwed 
mothers under age 18 are ineligible for TANF benefits unless they live 
in the home of an adult relative or in an arrangement—such as a group 
home—supervised by an adult.
It is impossible at this stage to predict how restrictive the new law 
will prove to be. For example, the five-year limit is likely to be less 
stringent than it appears. Up to 20 percent of the caseload can be 
exempted in cases of hardship. Moreover, states are not barred from 
using their own funds to provide benefits to those who have reached 
the five-year limit, and these funds could still be applied to their 
required maintenance-of-effort payment.
This study examines information that is relevant for implementing 
and assessing the possible impact of the new legislation. Some of the 
required program changes, such as a five-year time limit, will be a 
sharp departure from the status quo. Advocates of these changes point 
to the beneficial effects that a "tough love" policy might have by push 
ing welfare recipients toward independence; critics fear that most 
recipients lack the skills to become self-supporting and argue that a 
benefit cut-off would simply lead to greater deprivation for disadvan- 
taged families.2
The objective of this study is to provide information and new data 
analysis useful for informing three particular areas of concern raised 
by a time-limited reform and more broadly by other reforms. One is 
the extent to which recipients respond to changes in the incentives 
imbedded in the welfare benefit system; the second involves the char 
acteristics and work skills of welfare recipients; and the third is the 
effectiveness of employment and training programs. The book is orga 
nized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the AFDC program and examines 
trends in the size and composition of the welfare population. We exam 
ine the extent to which changes in the benefit structure may have 
shaped the changes in the size of the caseload and influenced the 
growth of female-headed families. In chapter 3 we describe patterns of 
welfare use focusing on the duration of welfare participation, both in a 
single episode and in multiple spells, and we examine the correlates of 
short-term and long-term participation. We identify individuals who
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are likely to become long-term participants and compare their detailed 
personal characteristics with those of participants who leave welfare 
after a relatively short stay. An analysis is presented of the work experi 
ence and earnings of women after leaving welfare, and a comparison is 
made with the experience and earnings of women who were never on 
welfare. Training and other program services can be more efficiently 
targeted with this information.
Chapter 4 reviews the lessons that are to be derived from past initia 
tives to increase the self-sufficiency of welfare recipients. After sum 
marizing earlier efforts such as the WIN program, we examine the 
experiments evaluating the effectiveness of recent work, education, and 
training programs. Special programs targeted on young teenage moth 
ers, as well as strict workfare programs, are distinguished from educa 
tion and training programs for older mothers with school-age children.
Chapter 5 addresses questions concerning the capacity of state and 
local government to implement a time-limited welfare reform, particu 
larly when it is tied to an aggressive work-oriented program providing 
for a significant increase in the number of welfare recipients participat 
ing in work-related activities. Much was expected from the framework 
established by the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills training program 
(JOBS), created by Title III of the Family Support Act (FSA) of 1988. 
JOBS made participation in the various component programs manda 
tory and required the targeting of program slots on certain subgroups 
of AFDC recipients. Did the JOBS framework make a difference? 
Chapter 5 also reviews the various experimental changes in the AFDC 
program that have been made under the state waiver program during 
the last few years.
Chapter 6 provides a summary and concluding comments, tying our 
findings to the implementation and possible outcomes of welfare 
reform.
NOTES
1. For a discussion of the political debate preceding the passage and signing of the new law 
and a detailed account of the provision, see Katz (1996, p. 269).
2. Haveman and Scholz (1994-1995) discuss some of the concerns associated with time-lim 
ited welfare and the general problems and conflicts inherent in any welfare reform.
CHAPTER
Program Description and Sources 
of Caseload Growth
This chapter first reviews basic information about benefits, eligibil 
ity, and broad participation trends in the AFDC program. It then exam 
ines changes in family welfare participation in detail and the relation 
between those changes and the growth in benefits, the number of fami 
lies headed by women, and other explanatory factors. Understanding 
the reaction of welfare recipients to past changes in benefit levels and 
structure is helpful in assessing how recipients will respond to the new 
legislation.
Program Description
AFDC, the nation's largest program of cash assistance to needy 
families, was established under the Social Security Act of 1935 as Aid 
to Dependent Children (ADC). Unlike social security, however, the 
program has always been administered by the states, and funding has 
been shared with the federal government. States set their own benefit 
levels and establish financial criteria for eligibility, subject to federal 
limitations and regulations. Benefits vary widely among the states. In 
1996, among the continental U.S. states, the maximum monthly AFDC 
cash benefit for a mother and two children with no other income 
ranged from a high of $650 in Vermont to a low of $120 in Mississippi 
(table 2.1).
The addition of food stamps significantly narrowed the range; the 
combined AFDC and food stamp benefit for such a family was $882 in 
Vermont and $433 in Mississippi. Free medical care (Medicaid) for all
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AFDC recipients and subsidized housing for many recipients further 
supplement the value of the benefit package in all states.
Table 2.1 Maximum Monthly AFDC Benefit and Combined AFDC-Food 
Stamp Benefit for a One-Parent Family of Three Persons; Five 
Highest and Five Lowest States, Continental U.S., 
January 1996
Maximum. 
AFDC benefit
Highest benefit states
Vermont
Connecticut
California
New York3
Rhode Island
Lowest benefit states
Mississippi
Alabama
Texas
Tennessee
Louisiana
Median AFDC state
650
636
607
577
565
120
164
188
185
190
389
Combined Ratio: combined 
AFDC-FS benefit to cash 
benefit benefit
882
872
852
847
822
433
477
501
498
503
699
1.36
1.37
1.40
1.47
1.45
3.61
2.91
2.66
2.69
2.65
1.80
SOURCE: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, 1996 Green Book, 
a. The benefit shown is for New York City. The cash benefit in Suffolk County is $703.
With respect to aggregate outlays, the federal and state governments 
combined spent $22.0 billion on AFDC cash benefits in fiscal year 
1995. State outlays totaled $10 billion, and the federal government 
contributed matching funds of $12.0 billion. However, total federal and 
state expenditures on AFDC families were about three times the 
amount spent on cash benefits alone, since most of these families 
received food stamps and Medicaid, and significant portions also 
received benefits such as subsidized housing and supplemental food for 
Women, Infants and Children (WIC).
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Eligibility
Eligibility for AFDC has been based on both family structure and 
income. The program has provided benefits to families with children 
under the age of 18 who have been deprived of parental support 
because their father or mother is absent from the home continuously or 
is deceased, incapacitated, or unemployed. Starting in 1961, it was 
optional for a state to offer AFDC benefits to two-parent families in 
which one parent was unemployed (the AFDC-UP Program), but after 
1990 all states were required to have such a program. The conditions 
for participation were more strict for these AFDC-UP families—the 
unemployed parent must have had a significant work history prior to 
application and could not work more than 100 hours in a month. 1 
Although the extension of the AFDC-UP program to all states slightly 
increased the percentage of UP cases, in practice most AFDC families 
(typically 95 percent) have been one- parent families headed by the 
mother. Thus, the number of female-headed families in the population 
was a basic factor underlying the size and growth of the AFDC pro 
gram.
Eligibility has also been based on two income tests. A family could 
not receive benefits if its gross income exceeded 185 percent of the 
state's need standard—an income standard set by the state for a given 
family size. In addition, the family's net income could not exceed the 
state's payment standard—the maximum benefit possible for a given 
family size. Net income has been calculated by subtracting from total 
income certain "disregards," including an earnings disregard (most 
recently $30 in monthly earnings for the first twelve months) and one- 
third of remaining earnings for the first four months, plus work 
expenses and child care allowances of $90 and $175 per month, 
respectively. An asset test has also been applied: excluding the home 
and one automobile, allowable resources have been limited to an equity 
value of $1,000 (assets minus liabilities). For purely mechanical rea 
sons, then, an increase in the maximum benefit level, or the payment 
standard, automatically increases eligibility (as does an increase in the 
income disregards), since the income cutoffs for program eligibility are 
closely tied to these factors.
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Program Roots
When the ADC program was first established in the 1930s, the intent 
was to improve the well-being of children who were caught unexpect 
edly in deprived circumstances because of the loss of a father's sup 
port, typically because of his death or disability. Since social security 
had just been enacted and all workers were not yet covered, unsup 
ported widowhood was a real possibility for many. The ADC benefits 
enabled the mother to stay home and care for her children at a time 
when work opportunities for women were more limited than today, and 
work in the home was more time-consuming.
ADC was expected to wither away as social security matured, as 
survivor benefits to workers' families became more generous and more 
universal, and as women's work opportunities grew. But it did not 
wither away. As depicted in figure 2.1, after slow program growth
Figure 2.1 AFDC Recipients as a Percent of Total U.S. Population
CD oo 3
CD 
Q_
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1940 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996
SOURCE: U.S. Social Security Administration, Social Security Bulletin; The Green Book, 1994; 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Monthly Population Estimates. 
NOTE: 1940-1960 numbers reported in calendar years. 1961-1995 numbers reported in fiscal 
years.
through the 1950s, participation in the program escalated sharply dur 
ing the late 1960s and early 1970s. Between 1964 and 1972, some 6.5 
million adults and children were added to the welfare rolls, and the
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proportion of the U.S. population on AFDC rose from about 2 percent 
to 5 percent. After 1976, the total number of recipients stabilized while 
the proportion of the population on welfare declined and fluctuated 
around the 4.5 percent level throughout the 1980s. Starting in 1990, 
welfare participation surged again, reaching a record high of 5.5 per 
cent of the population in 1993. After stabilizing in 1994, participation 
declined to 5.2 percent of the population in 1995.
Between the inception of AFDC and the present, a major change has 
taken place in the reasons for a child's dependency on the program. 
When the program began, the father's death or disability accounted for 
75 percent of AFDC cases; but by 1969, this percentage had fallen to 
17 percent and by 1991, to 5.6 percent. At the same time, the mother's 
having no marriage tie became the most important basis for eligibility, 
accounting for close to 60 percent of the families on AFDC in 1991 
compared to 28 percent in 1969.
Caseload Growth Since 1960
In analyzing changes in AFDC participation, it is informative to 
examine the change in the number of families or cases on welfare, 
rather than the total number of recipients, which can include varying 
proportions of children and adults.
Caseload growth can be measured in several ways. Figure 2.2 plots 
the total caseload as a percentage of all families with children under 18 
over the period 1960-1995; figure 2.3 shows only the BASIC AFDC 
caseload (omitting families in the unemployed fathers program) as a 
percentage of the subgroup of single mother (female-headed) families. 
Both series reveal a sharply rising proportion of their respective popu 
lations going on welfare between 1965 and 1976. But the proportion of 
all families on welfare (figure 2.2) is the more steeply rising series over 
the whole period (1960-1995), largely reflecting the substantial and 
steady increase in the proportion of families headed by single mothers. 
(As shown in figure 2.4, the proportion of families with children 
headed by a single mother rose from 10.2 percent in 1965 to almost 
23.0 percent in 1995.)
The proportion of all families receiving AFDC remained relatively 
constant between 1976 and 1989, the net outcome of two offsetting 
trends: one, a continuing but slower rate of increase in families headed
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Figure 2.2 Percent of AH Families with Children Receiving 
AFDC 1960-1995
Percent
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SOURCE: U.S. Social Security Administration, Social Security Bulletin; The Green Book, 1994; 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports; Income, Poverty, and Valuation of Non- 
cash Benefits: 1994; Department of health and Human Services, unpublished tables.
Figure 2.3 Percent of All Single-Mother Families Receiving
AFDC 1960-1995 
Percent
70
30 ©I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I | I
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
SOURCE: The Green Book, 1994; U.S. Social Security Administration, Social Security Bulletin; 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, 1994; Department of health and Human 
Services, unpublished tables.
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by a single mother (figure 2.4); the second, a decline in AFDC partici 
pation among female-headed families (figure 2.3). After 1989 a rise in 
both the welfare participation rate of single mothers and the proportion 
of families headed by a single mother resulted once again in a large 
increase in the proportion of all families on welfare. 2 That proportion 
declined in 1995, however, as both the proportion of families headed 
by women and the proportion of female-headed families receiving wel 
fare declined.
Figure 2.4 Single-Mother Families as a Percent of All Families 
with Child
Percent
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SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports; Income, Poverty and Valua 
tion ofNoncash Benefits: 1994.
Sources of Caseload Growth
The growth of the AFDC caseload was likely to be influenced by 
many factors—demographic, economic, cultural, and programmatic. 
We first focus on the relation between caseload growth and changes in 
the financial incentives to go on welfare, both welfare benefits and 
earnings opportunities, and then discuss the relation between those
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incentives and the growth in single-mother families, the primary group 
eligible for benefits.
The Welfare Benefit Package
When the value of the welfare benefit package increases relative to 
potential earnings, the pecuniary incentive to go on welfare also 
increases. In many states a mother with two children who could earn 
only the minimum wage would have to work 40 hours a week and 50 
weeks a year to earn an income comparable to that provided by wel 
fare. 3 Studies of the incentive effects of the welfare system generally 
have found that, other things the same, states with relatively high wel 
fare benefits have tended to have relatively high rates of participation 
in the AFDC program (Moffitt 1992).
Can changes in welfare benefits over the years account for changes 
in welfare participation? The level of the real AFDC cash benefit taken 
alone increased by a modest 10 percent between 1964 and 1972 and 
then actually declined significantly as the states failed to increase cash 
benefits enough to keep up with inflation (figure 2.5). By 1994, the 
cash benefit in real terms was 34 percent below the 1964 level. Yet by 
any measure, participation in the AFDC program in 1994 was consid 
erably above that of 1964.
But it is highly misleading to focus only on the pattern of change in 
the cash benefit, which has become an increasingly small component 
of the total welfare package. A growing percentage of government 
spending on the welfare population has taken the form of noncash ben 
efits since 1964, with the introduction and expansion of programs such 
as food stamps and other food programs for women and children (for 
example, the WIC program), Medicaid, and subsidized housing. When 
we estimate the combined value of benefits received from the three 
major programs—AFDC, food stamps, and Medicaid—the benefit 
package is shown to have increased substantially (after adjusting for 
inflation) between 1964 and 1976 (figure 2.5).4 Although the combined 
benefit declined between 1976 and 1994, that decline is much more 
modest than the decline in the cash benefit alone. As a result, in 1994, 
the real (inflation-adjusted) value of the combined benefit package
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remained 60 percent above the level of benefits provided in 1964 when 
benefits were largely confined only to the cash component.
Figure 2.5 Annual Benefits for a Family of Four (1995 $)
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The combined welfare benefit package would seem to be a more 
appropriate measure for judging the gain from going on welfare than 
the cash component alone (see note 3). And over the past thirty years 
taken as a whole, changes in welfare participation have roughly corre 
sponded with the change in the total benefit package, although the rela 
tion is stronger between 1964 and 1976 than in the period thereafter.
The Role of Earnings Opportunities
Opportunities for earning an income off welfare also contribute to 
the financial incentive to go on welfare and, therefore, should be taken 
into account. We show earnings trends of women and men, 25-34 years 
of age, with and without high school diplomas, since a large proportion 
of AFDC participants do not go beyond high school (figure 2.6). Male 
earnings trends are shown because they help reflect the potential
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income women may receive from marriage. As depicted, the earnings 
of 25-34-year-old men, at or below the high school level, have declined 
significantly in real terms since the late 1970s. The earnings of women 
in these age-education groupings remained fairly constant until the late 
1980s, but declined somewhat during the 1990-92 recession.
Figure 2.6 Median Annual Earnings of Year-Round, Full-Time 
Workers, 25-34 Years Old (1995 $)
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As a consequence of the sharp decline in men's earnings, the com 
bined AFDC benefit level rose relative to men's earnings in the 1980s 
(figure 2.7). That factor may have contributed to the increase in female- 
headed families in the 1980s and to the steady level of AFDC participa 
tion measured as a percent of all families with children (figure 2.2), 
even though the level of the total benefit package declined modestly. 
Benefits declined as a percentage of women's earnings (figure 2.8) 
through the mid 1980s, but rose relative to their earnings in the late 
1980s through the early 1990s. The rise in this ratio also may have con 
tributed to the rise in single-parent families, as well as in welfare par-
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ticipation, particularly among high school dropouts for whom these 
benefits-to-earnings patterns were more pronounced.
Have Welfare Benefits Influenced the Rise in Single-Mother Families?
The significant growth in female-headed families (figure 2.4) has 
been the main source of any increase in the AFDC caseload since 1970, 
as the AFDC participation rate among female-headed families has 
declined for much of that time (figure 2.3). An important question then 
is whether the increase in families headed by a single mother has itself 
been motivated by the growth in welfare benefits or, alternatively, has 
been an entirely independent phenomenon unrelated to the welfare 
program.
There are theoretical grounds for believing that increases in welfare 
income would have a positive effect on the formation of female-headed 
families, since the availability of benefits enables a woman to support 
her children outside marriage and without working. However, the 
strength of the effect would depend on the amount of income provided 
by welfare compared to the income attainable off welfare—through 
marriage and/or work, as well as individual attitudes toward welfare 
recipiency. 5
The existing social science literature, however, has not provided a 
clear answer to the question of whether increases in the value of the 
welfare benefit package influence out-of-wedlock childbearing and 
other behaviors associated with the formation in female-headed fami 
lies. Summing up the results of seventy-one studies of the effects of 
welfare on marriage and fertility, Robert A. Moffitt (1996) has recently 
concluded:
The research literature on the effects of welfare on marriage and 
fertility contains a large number of studies. The studies use a wide 
variety of methodologies and data sets and cover different time 
periods over the last thirty years. Unfortunately, aside from a few 
patterns that have been established, the findings of the studies are 
extremely diverse, ranging from findings of no effect of welfare to 
findings of strong negative effects of welfare on marriage and pos 
itive effects on fertility, particularly nonmarital (Summary, p. i).
Moffitt notes, however, that while studies from the 1970s found little or 
no evidence of an effect of welfare on marriage and out-of-wedlock
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childbearing, more recent studies have arrived at a "rough consensus" 
supporting an effect, although the magnitude of such an effect varies 
among the studies.
Of course, the relative generosity of welfare benefits is not the only 
factor influencing the formation of single-mother families. Another 
causal factor that is likely to have increased in significance over the 
past two decades is the growing ability of women to support them 
selves through work. The increases in women's skills and work partici 
pation and the rise in women's earnings relative to men's may have 
primarily reduced fertility and delayed marriage, but also may have 
contributed to the rise in female-headed families by enabling women to 
be economically independent. Women with relatively high earnings are 
less likely to go on welfare, however, although the existence of welfare 
could provide an insurance safety net. Thus it should not be expected 
that welfare participation and female-headed families would rise and 
fall in tandem, even if the availability and generosity of welfare was a 
significant factor influencing the level of female-headed families 
among women with poor earnings prospects.
The observation has been made that welfare cannot account for the 
rise in female-headed families that occurred between 1970 and the late 
1980s, since caseload growth leveled off after 1975 while the total 
number of families headed by women continued to rise rapidly. The 
caseload, however, was undergoing a significant compositional change 
during this period, as the subgroup of women who had never married 
comprised an increasingly large share of the AFDC caseload, rising 
from about one-third in 1975 to about 58 percent in 1988. In conse 
quence, while the total number of AFDC families increased only 
slightly between 1975 and 1988, the number of AFDC families headed 
by a woman whose children were born out-of-wedlock almost doubled. 
Presumably, that rise in never-married mothers on AFDC was offset by 
declining participation of formerly-married female heads. The rise in 
earnings opportunities for women with higher levels of skill would 
help explain the participation decline for this group.
The Role of Program Changes
Changes in the rules governing earnings disregards have also had an 
impact on AFDC caseload trends, although the intended objective to
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increase work incentives has not always been the result. Consequently, 
government policy on this issue has changed sharply over time.
As part of the Work Incentive program (WIN) enacted in 1967, 
monetary work incentives (the earnings disregards) were introduced. 
These incentive provisions changed the AFDC benefit formula to allow 
recipients who worked to keep a larger share of their benefits as their 
earnings increased than was possible under earlier programs. 6 The 
objective of this so-called "30 and a third" provision was to encourage 
welfare mothers to increase their work effort and, as a result, "to work 
their way off welfare." Yet the proportion of AFDC mothers who 
worked from 1961 to 1975—the period spanning before and after the 
1967 "incentive provisions"—changed little, fluctuating between 15 
and 16 percent (Council of Economic Advisers, 1976, p. 99 and table 
2.2 in the text below.
In other respects, the WIN earnings disregard provision may have 
indirectly reduced work effort and increased the AFDC caseload. By 
enhancing the-income attainable from welfare, it reduced the incentive 
to leave welfare completely. Moreover, welfare was made accessible to 
a new group of women whose higher earnings previously would have 
made them ineligible (see chapter 5 for a detailed analysis). The WIN 
disregards appear to have increased the AFDC caseload. At the same 
time, the work participation of women receiving AFDC remained con 
siderably below that of single mothers not participating in the program. 
As shown in table 2.2, in 1975 only 16 percent of AFDC mothers 
worked compared to 32 percent of all never-married mothers, 57 per 
cent of all mothers who were divorced or separated, and 41 percent of 
married mothers.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA) essen 
tially removed the earnings disregard provisions in the AFDC program 
that had been introduced by WIN, although they were later partially 
restored in 1984 and 1988 legislation. 7 In addition, states were prohib 
ited from paying AFDC benefits to any family with income exceeding 
150 percent of a state's standard of need (raised to a threshold of 185 
percent by the 1984 legislation). These changes reduced the amount a 
person could earn and still remain on AFDC. Studies have shown that 
the OBRA caps and the repeal of the disregards played a significant 
role in reducing the caseload at the national level, as well as in certain 
states (O'Neill 1990a; Peskin, Topogna, and Marcotte 1992). Thus,
Lessons for Welfare Reform 19
OBRA was a contributing factor to the observed modest caseload 
decline in the 1980s.
Table 2.2 Employed Mothers as a Percentage of All Mothers (with 
Children under 18), by Marital Status and for AFDC 
Participants, 1975-1992
Married, 
Year spouse present
1975
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
40.5
50.9
52.1
51.6
52.4
54.9
56.8
57.6
60.4
61.9
63.1
63.5
63.2
63.9
Never 
married
32.1
39.9
38.3
36.2
34.5
36.3
39.2
37.8
40.2
40.2
43.1
45.1
44.0
43.4
Divorced, 
separated, 
widowed
56.8
63.0
62.9
61.9
58.4
62.8
63.0
65.6
66.2
65.9
65,9
67.9
66.1
65.3
AFDC 
mothers
16
n.a.
14
7
5
5
n.a.
6
6
6
6
7
n.a.
6
SOURCE: Percentage employed by marital status is derived from unpublished data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. The employment of AFDC mothers is from U.S. House of Representa 
tives, Committee on Ways and Means, Green Book 1992 and 7994.
The effects of OBRA on women's work participation are complex. 
OBRA reduced the caseload, thereby increasing the number of women 
in the population who are likely to work; at the same time it reduced 
work participation among AFDC recipients (table 2.2). The net out 
come of these effects is ambiguous.
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Recent Caseload Developments
The prolonged economic downturn that started after 1989 may have 
had a particularly severe impact on young, low-skilled workers, and 
these effects would not be adequately captured by the earnings' series 
that refer to full-time, year-round workers. In a detailed study of the 
determinants of caseload change, a Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) study (Peskin 1993) estimated that about one-quarter of the 
caseload increase between 1989 and 1992 could be attributed to sag 
ging employment and rising unemployment. The CBO also estimated 
that one-half of the recent increase in the size of the AFDC caseload 
could be attributed to increases in female-headed families. However, as 
discussed above, changes in the number of female-headed families 
itself is likely to respond to changes in earnings opportunities off wel 
fare and benefits on welfare. Consequently, it is difficult to determine 
how much of the caseload growth is really explained by economic fac 
tors versus growth in female-headed families.
About 15 percent of recent caseload growth is unexplained by the 
CBO model. Among the factors that could have contributed to this 
growth but are difficult to quantify, are several policy changes cited in 
the CBO report. One factor is the impact of the Immigration Reform 
and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), which legalized 2.6 million undocu 
mented aliens. Although the Act instituted a five-year waiting period 
for AFDC eligibility following legalization, it appears that after 1987, 
some aliens began to claim benefits for their children born in the 
United States, since they themselves no longer faced deportation by 
making their presence known to the government. Moreover, the five- 
year waiting period would have ended in the spring of 1992 for many 
aliens, thereby making a large new population group eligible for bene 
fits.
A second policy change that coincided with the recent surge in case 
load growth is the implementation of the Family Support Act of 1988. 
Although the JOBS component of the Act (the Job Opportunities and 
Basic Skills training program) was expected to help reduce the AFDC 
caseload, it is possible that it actually increased the caseload in the 
short run by delaying the exit of those engaged in training. Moreover, 
the provision of transitional benefits (subsidized child care and Medic- 
aid) for a twelve-month period after leaving AFDC may have made
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AFDC more attractive to some individuals, thereby increasing program 
entry rates.
By the end of 1994 and throughout 1995, the AFDC caseload 
declined both in absolute terms and as a percentage of families, no 
matter how defined. Preliminary data show a continuing decline in the 
first half of 1996.
No doubt the decline is related to recovery from the recession of the 
early 1990s and the accompanying sharp drop in unemployment, 
although other factors may also be relevant. For example, in the past 
few years (prior to the passage of welfare reform) many states have 
adopted measures making welfare less generous and harder to get, or 
have conducted other reform initiatives under waivers granted by the 
Department of Health and Human Services. However, evaluations of 
these efforts are not yet available. The 1996 welfare reform legislation 
went into effect at the end of 1996, and states are only beginning to 
restructure their programs in response to the legislation. Although the 
new regime is likely to result in further reductions in caseload, it is 
impossible at this time to predict the long-run effects of the new law 
with any precision.
Other recent programmatic changes that enhance the disposable 
incomes of low-wage workers may also help to reduce the welfare 
caseload. The earned income tax credit (EITC), which provides a 
refundable tax credit for low-wage earners, has been liberalized. In 
addition, Medicaid has been extended to pregnant women and children 
in low-income families not on AFDC.
NOTES
1. A number of states have obtained waivers under JOBS to experiment with dropping the 
work history requirement for married couples with children and unemployed parents. (See chapter 
5.)
2. Since 1980, the unemployed parent component of AFDC (AFDC-UP) has tended to 
increase somewhat faster than the BASIC (single mother) component, further causing the total 
caseload (BASIC plus AFDC-UP) to rise faster than the BASIC component alone. Effective Octo 
ber 1990, under the Family Support Act of 1988, all states were required to have an AFDC-UP 
program for two-parent families. AFDC-UP accounted for 6.8 percent of all AFDC cases in 1992 
and 7.6 percent in 1994, reflecting a rise from 5.1 percent in 1989. Based on past cyclical behavior 
of the AFDC-UP caseload, the recent rise appears to be more the result of higher unemployment 
than the result of the extension of eligibility.
3. In 1993, sixteen states paid to a single-parent family with two children and no earnings a 
combined AFDC and food stamp benefit that exceeded $700 a month or $8.400 per year. If a
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mother worked 2,000 hours per year (an unusually heavy work schedule for a mother with young 
children) she would earn $8,500 if paid at the minimum hourly wage of $4.25. Although she 
would be eligible for the earned income tax credit (EITC) and a smaller food stamp benefit, she 
would pay social security taxes and incur child care, transportation and other work expenses, and 
she would have less access to medical benefits and subsidized housing than a welfare mother.
4. Data for the combined AFDG-food stamp benefit level (for a family of four with no other 
income) are from U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, 1992, and 
unpublished data, expressed in 1995 dollars using the CPI-XI. The value of Medicaid was 
obtained using program data on Medicaid expenditures for AFDC cash recipients (children and 
adults separately). These data were adjusted to exclude disproportionate share expenditures 
(DSH) and to include payments made to HMOs for AFDC recipients. Total adjusted payments 
were divided by the average monthly number of AFDC adult and child recipients to obtain an 
approximation of the insurance value of Medicaid per adult and per child. We assumed that this 
insurance value or "market value" measured the value of medicaid coverage to AFDC recipients. 
A more precise measure is "recipient value," and it is usually somewhat less than the market value 
of an in-kind benefit. However, recipient value is very difficult to measure empirically.
The total family benefit is for the more typical family of one adult and two children. Since the 
charge for a family premium for health insurance usually is constant across families with varying 
numbers of children, the benefit for the family of three was also used for the family of four in our 
example. In 1994, the estimated premium for such a family was $4,460. This is close to the low 
end .of costs for a comprehensive HMO policy including the combined employer and employee 
shares. Medicaid covers drugs and frequently dental and optical services, which are often 
excluded from standard health insurance. It is, however, difficult to compare the level and quality 
of care provided by medicaid with that of private health care. The estimated Medicaid benefit for 
the years 1976-1994 is expressed in 1995 dollars using the PCE deflator for services. The deflator 
for medical services was not used because of the likely substantial overstatement of medical infla 
tion in the data due to failure to adjust for quality changes in medical care.
5. The theoretical framework for analyzing family behavior in the context of the gains for mar 
riage versus alternatives (e.g., welfare) derives from Gary S. Decker. See Decker (1981).
6. Prior to the 1967 Amendments, earned income in many states was subject to an implicit 100 
percent tax—a mother lost one dollar in welfare benefits for each dollar earned. Under the WIN 
"income disregard" provisions, a recipient lost nothing in welfare payments until she earned at 
least $30 per month (after deducting child care costs and other work-related expenses), and then 
her welfare payment was reduced by only 66 cents for every dollar earned beyond $30 per month.
7. Some states have received federal waivers in their operation of education and training pro 
grams, allowing them to experiment with more generous provisions of earnings disregards. (See 
chapter 5.)
CHAPTER
Patterns of Welfare and Work 
Participation and Their Correlates
This chapter analyzes recent patterns of welfare use and work par 
ticipation among young mothers (through their early thirties) and the 
characteristics associated with the different patterns observed. Among 
the topics addressed are: the factors associated with both the incidence 
of welfare participation and the duration of time spent on welfare; dif 
ferences in the characteristics of short-term and long-term participants; 
the work experience, earnings, and incomes of those who leave wel 
fare; and the potential market earnings of those who stay on welfare.
The analysis also provides information on the characteristics of 
those who are most likely to encounter difficulties in leaving welfare. 
Specifically, we describe the characteristics of those who stay on wel 
fare for short and long periods under the current system. Although it is 
anticipated that the imposition of a time-limited welfare reform will 
change the motivation, and therefore the welfare and work patterns, of 
those who go on welfare, the extent of those changes is not known with 
any certainty.
We utilize two data sources in this chapter. The first is the Current 
Population Survey (CPS), which every March collects supplementary 
information identifying persons who received AFDC during the pre 
ceding calendar year. This is a large national sample of the U.S. popu 
lation, and detail is provided on the characteristics of individuals and 
their families and households. However, receipt of AFDC benefits is 
believed to be underreported by the CPS, particularly among those 
who received benefits for only a portion of the year or who were no 
longer recipients as of the March survey date (Goudreau, Oberheu, and 
Denton 1984). Appendix A compares CPS and official caseload esti-
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mates of AFDC recipients and examines reasons for the differences in 
estimates.
Our major data source is the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY)—a microdata file of approximately 10,000 civilian men and 
women, first interviewed in 1979 when they were 14 to 22 years of age 
and reinterviewed each year. We include survey results for women 
through 1992 when they had reached ages 27 to 35. Thus the survey 
follows young women over a period of their life cycle when many 
types of dysfunctional behaviors develop, including early out-of-wed- 
lock births and welfare dependency. The NLSY provides information 
on these and many other characteristics, such as parental background, 
schooling, and, what is particularly unique, academic achievement 
measured by the youth's score on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test 
(AFQT), which was administered to all respondents.
Overview of Welfare Participation
We start with a summary table showing CPS data on the proportion 
of women who have a child under age 18, the proportion of mothers 
who are not currently married, and the incidence of AFDC receipt 
among two cross sections of women ages 16-49, one taken in 1987 and 
the other in 1992 (table 3.1). 1
Only a small percentage of women ages 16-49 in the population are 
heads of AFDC families (4.1 percent in 1987, 4.5 percent in 1992). 
However, to fit into this category, a woman must be a mother and be 
without the support of a husband. In 1992, 51 percent of all women 
ages 16-49 were mothers of children under the age of 18 years. Of 
these, 27 percent were single (i.e., never-married, divorced, separated, 
or widowed). As shown in table 3.1, close to 9 percent of all mothers 
and one-third of single mothers headed AFDC families in 1992.
Welfare receipt is strongly related to age, with women in their twen 
ties having the highest incidence. In 1992, 7.4 percent of all women 
ages 20-24 received AFDC, compared to 3.5 percent of those at ages 
35-39. The proportion of women who have children is still low at ages 
20-24 (only 30 percent have children compared to 74 percent at ages 
35-39). But those who do have children are more likely to be single
Table 3.1 Percentage of Women who have Children under Age 18, Mothers who are Single, and the Receipt of 
AFDC, 1987 and 1992; Women 16-49 Years of Age
Age
16-19
20-24
25-29
30.34
35-39
40-49
16-49
Women with children 
under 18 as percent 
of all women
1987
7.9
30.6
55.5
72.0
74.9
50.3
50.8
1992
8.6
30.5
55.0
70.1
74.2
49.1
51.2
Single mothers
as a percent 
of all mothers
1987
68.2
38.9
26.5
21.9
20.9
20.2
24.7
1992
70.8
46.7
32.1
24.3
22.3
21.7
27.0
Percent receiving AFDC
Of all women
1987
1.9
6.0
6.0
5.23~7
1.9
4.1
1992
2.5
7.4
7.6
5.7
3.5
1.9
4.5
Of all mothers
1987
23.4
19.7
10.9
7.3
4.9
3.8
8.1
1992
29.7
24.3
13.9
8.2
4.8
3.9
8.9
Of all single mothers
1987
34.4
50.6
41.1
33.2
23.7
18.7
32.8
1992
42.0
52.1
43.3
33.6
21.4
18.2
32.8
SOURCE: Current Population Survey, micro data files, March 1988 and March 1993.
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mothers—46.7 percent of the younger mothers compared to 22.3 per 
cent of the older mothers in 1992. Young single mothers are also much 
more likely to go on welfare than are older single mothers. Thus, 52 
percent of single mothers ages 20-24 were on AFDC in 1992, com 
pared to 21 percent of single mothers in the age group 35-39. The inci 
dence of AFDC receipt among single mothers increased slightly 
between 1987 and 1992 among women under the age of 30, but was 
unchanged overall as the proportion of women in their thirties and for 
ties increased relative to other age groups.
Incidence and Duration of Welfare Participation: The Role 
of Marital Status and Age at Birth of First Child
The number of AFDC families that we observe at any point in time 
is the result of decisions made by two groups of family heads. The first 
refers to the decision whether to go on AFDC made by those who are 
not yet on welfare. (This is the incidence of participation.) The other 
decision is made by families already on AFDC and concerns whether 
to stay with the program or to leave, and this decision influences the 
duration of time spent on AFDC. In this section we utilize the longitu 
dinal information in the NLSY to describe patterns of welfare use and 
the characteristics associated with greater incidence and greater dura 
tion.
Welfare Incidence
Table 3.2 examines the percentage of women who ever received 
welfare during the 14-year period 1978 through 1991 for all women in 
the NLSY who had a first birth between 1978 and 1984. The table viv 
idly demonstrates the importance of both an out-of-wedlock birth and 
teenage motherhood as predictors of welfare receipt. Of course the two 
factors are highly correlated. As shown in the second row of the table, 
55.7 percent of mothers who had a first child before reaching age 18 
bore that child out-of-wedlock; this percentage falls to 15.7 percent for 
women bearing a first child at age 20 or older.
Lessons for Welfare Reform 27
The combined effect of early childbearing and an out-of-wedlock 
birth is powerful: 82 percent of women who were both younger than 
age 18 and unmarried at the time of their first birth eventually went on 
welfare. Although the effect is weaker among older women, out-of- 
wedlock childbearing continues to be associated with a high probabil 
ity of welfare use. (The probability of welfare receipt is 72.5 percent if 
the mother is unwed but is age 20 or older.) Still, age at first birth 
appears to be strongly related to future welfare receipt among women 
who were married at the time of their first birth. The proportion of mar 
ried women who ever went on welfare was 47 percent if the mother 
was younger than age 18 at first birth and falls to 16 percent if she was 
age 20 or older.
Table 3.2 Percent Unmarried at First Birth and Percent Ever on Welfare 
During 1978-1991 by Marital Status and Age of Mother at First 
Birth: NLSY Women with a First Birth between 1978 and 1984
Age of mother at first birth
All mothers (OOOs)
Percent unmarried at first birth
Percent ever on welfare, 1978-91
Married at first birth (OOOs)
Percent ever on welfare, 1978-91
Unmarried at first birth (OOOs)
Percent ever on welfare, 1978-91
Sample size
Under 18
666
55.7
66.9
295
47.3
371
82.4
259
18-19
1,421
36.6
47.6
900
30.6
520
77.0
496
20 or older
3,420
15.7
24.8
2,883
15.9
537
72.5
933
SOURCE: NLSY microfiles.
NOTE: Population totals and all percentages are weighted to national totals.
Further detail about the timing of entry onto welfare after having a 
first birth is shown in table 3.3. The proportion entering welfare is 
again classified by age and marital status of mother at first birth, but 
now the data are grouped into three narrow windows of time when 
births took place: 1978-81; 1982-84; 1985-87. What table 3.3 plainly 
shows is that an out-of-wedlock first birth is strongly associated with
Table 3.3 Proportion of NLSY Mothers Entering Welfare by Timing of Entry, Year of First Birth, Marital Status, 
and Age of Mother at First Birth
First birth out-of-wedlock
Mothers age at birth
20 years 
All ages Under 20 or older
Year of first birth is 1978-1981
Percent entered welfare
0-2 years after first birth
3-5 years after first birth
6-8 years after first birth
9-10 years after first birth
Cummulative percent on 
welfare through 1991
Year of first birth is 1982-1984
Percent entered welfare
0-2 years after first birth
3-5 years after first birth
6-8 years after first birth
50.8
16.3
5.8
5.3
78.2
48.8
13.3
2.6
49.8
18.3
6.6
6.2
80.9
52.2
6.1
2.2
54.3
9.3
3.4
2.4
69.4
46.7
17.6
2.8
Married at time of first birth
Mothers age at birth
20 years 
All ages Under 20 or older
7.3
9.4
5.4
3.7
25.8
7.9
3.9
3.1
9.9
15.2
6.7
4.9
36.7
14.4
6.2
6.6
5.4
5.0
4.4
2.8
17.8
6.7
3.5
2.4
Cummulative percent on 
welfare through 1991 a 64.7 63.4 67.1 14.9 27.2 12.6
Year of first birth is 1985-1987
Percent entered welfare
0-2 years after first birth 34.1 n.o. 34.1 4.7 n.o. 4.7 
3-5 years after first birth 4.3 n.o. 4.3 3.0 n.o 3.0
Cummulative percent 
on welfare through 1991 a____39.0______n.o.______39.0______93______n.o_______9.3
NOTE: n.o. = no observations on this group in the sample.
a. Cummulative percent may include a small percentage in categories of years since birth not separately shown.
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entry onto welfare within two years of the birth, regardless of the age 
of the mother. Approximately 50 percent of unwed mothers go on wel 
fare during the two years following their first birth. By the end of ten 
years, close to 80 percent have joined the caseload.
Among women who are married at first birth, entry onto welfare is 
expected to be delayed, since it takes time for a marriage to unravel. 
Although there is a tendency for the proportion of women entering 
welfare among this group to be greater in the first two years after birth 
than subsequently, this pattern is not as consistent or as pronounced as 
the pattern for unwed mothers.
A reading of these tables indicates that external economic events are 
also likely to influence welfare entry. That is, the high proportion of 
teenage married women going on welfare shortly after their first birth 
in 1982-84 may be attributable in some part to the recession of 1982- 
83. The recession may also have accounted for the bulge in welfare 
entry three to five years after first birth for young married women 
whose first birth was in 1978-81.
Welfare Duration
The length of time a recipient stays on welfare is a crucial dimen 
sion of the welfare problem, and it is obviously a key factor in imple 
menting a reform with a time limit. There are several ways of 
describing welfare duration, as illustrated in table 3.4. The first two 
columns refer to periods of welfare participation starting from the indi 
vidual's first entry onto the welfare rolls. However, while the first col 
umn refers only to the first period of continuous welfare participation 
(the first welfare spell), the second column includes all years of welfare 
participation observed, which may include several spells of participa 
tion separated by periods of nonparticipation. 2
The importance of considering multiple spells is highlighted in table 
3.4. If only the first spell is counted, about half of welfare participants 
exit the program within two years, although somewhat more than a 
quarter of the participants receive benefits for more than five years. 
This result corresponds to findings from previous studies of welfare 
dynamics (for example, Bane and Ellwood 1983; O'Neill, Wolf, Bassi, 
and Hannan 1984; Ellwood 1986; O'Neill, Bassi, and Wolf 1987; 
Blank 1989). Nonetheless, recidivism is also relatively high. If all
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years on AFDC are counted (from all spells), then the proportion stay 
ing on longer than two years rises to close to 70 percent, and the pro 
portion accumulating more than five years ,of participation rises to 42 
percent.
Table 3.4 Proportion of Welfare Recipients Remaining on Welfare 
Longer than a Specified Number of Years Under Different 
Ways of Defining Welfare Duration (NLSY women with a first 
birth in 1978 or later)
Women starting a first AFDC spell 
in 1978-1984
Years on welfare 
more than
1
2
3
4
5
Mean years
Population (000s)a
Sample size
Counting years in 
first spell only
0.639
0.496
0.384
0.320
0.268
3.83
1,506
607
Counting total 
years on AFDC 
1978-1991
0.829
0.688
0.558
0.501
0.418
5.13
1,506
607
Women on AFDC 
in 1991
Counting total 
years on AFDC 
1978-1991
0.886
0.810
0.729
0.658
0.559
6.45
1,275
517
NOTE: Recipients are restricted to women surveyed by the NLSY in 1992 and with complete wel 
fare information for 1978-1991. These women were ages 26-33 in 1991. 
a. The population is weighted to reflect national totals.
Although only 42 percent of all women who went on AFDC accu 
mulated more than five years of participation, this group makes up the 
majority of women who are observed as part of the caseload at a partic 
ular point in time. The welfare duration of women who were counted 
in the caseload in 1991 is shown in column 3 of table 3.4. The domi 
nance of the caseload by long-term participants is evident: More than 
80 percent of the women had spent more than two years in the pro 
gram, and 56 percent were on the rolls for more than five years.
The age and marital status of the mother at the time of her first birth 
are important predictors of welfare duration, just as they were for the
Table 3.5 Proportion of Welfare Recipients on Welfare More than a Specified Number of Total Years, from Time of 
Entry Through 1991: NLSY Mothers Starting a First AFDC Spell in 1978-1984, by Marital Status and 
Age at Time of Birth
Under age 20 at first birth
Total years on welfare 
are greather than
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Mean years
Population (00s)b
Sample size
Out-of-wedlock 
first birth
0.890
0.756
0.633
0.590
0.504
0.408
0.346
0.273a
5.81
789
373
Married 
at first birth
0.714
0.585
0.460
0.388
0.298
0.253
0.206
0.1423
4.31
400
116
Age 20 or older at first birth
Out-of-wedlock 
first birth
0.910
0.717
0.577
0.468
0.402
0.357
0.279
0.1763
4.98
152
65
Married 
at first birth
0.738
0.581
0.421
0.379
0.318
0.293
0.204
0.0503
4.02
165
53
a. Estimates is unreliable since a portion of the sample was exposed to AFDC for less than 8 years. 
b. Population numbers are weighted to reflect national totals.
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probability of ever going on welfare in the first place. Table 3.5 shows 
these relationships through the concept of duration, portrayed in col 
umn 2 of table 3.4 (namely, total years accumulated on welfare through 
1991 for women first going on AFDC in the period 1978-1984). 
Among women younger than age 20 and unwed at the time of first 
birth, 50 percent accumulated more than five years on welfare and 35 
percent participated longer than seven years. A first birth at an older 
age reduced duration somewhat, but those who were married at first 
birth had significantly shorter periods of participation.
Table 3.6 displays the distribution of duration probabilities (count 
ing multiple spells), by race and Hispanic ethnicity and by marital sta 
tus at first birth, for women starting a welfare spell in 1978-1984. 
Although duration differs substantially between racial and ethnic 
groups, the difference by marital status within the same racial/ethnic 
group is even more pronounced. For example, among white women the 
average number of years spent on welfare through 1991 was 5.27 years 
for unwed mothers and 4.09 years for married mothers—a difference 
of 1.18 years. However, when we compare duration across racial/ethnic 
groups among women who bore their first child out-of-wedlock, we 
find that the average years spent on welfare were 5.27 years for white 
women, 6 years for black women, and 5.64 years for Hispanic 
women—a differential of 0.73 years between white and black women 
and only 0.37 years between white and Hispanic women.
Although age at first birth, marital status, and race/ethnicity are 
important correlates of benefit duration, it is also true that other factors 
influence how long a recipient stays on welfare. This is because dura 
tion varies considerably among women of the same marital status, age 
at first birth, and race/ethnicity. We turn now to a broader examination 
of the characteristics of women who leave welfare and those who stay.
Characteristics of Nonparticipants and of Welfare 
Leavers and Stayers
The characteristics of NLSY women with a first birth in 1978-1982 
are shown in table 3.7. Panel A of the table shows women classified by 
marital status at first birth and by whether they ever received welfare
Table 3.6 Proportion of Welfare Recipients on Welfare More Than a Specified Number of Total Years, from Entry 
through 1991: NLSY Women Starting a First Welfare Spell in 1978-1984 by Race and Hispanic Origin 
and Marital Status at First Birth
Black
Total years on Out-of- 
welfare are wedlock first 
greater than birth
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Mean years to date
Population (000s)b
Sample size
0.896
0.772
0.662
0.606
0.526
0.447
0.370
0.282a
6.00
486
294
Married at 
first birth
0.784
0.695
0.582
0.494
0.449
0.332
0.285
0.4608
4.75
56
33
White
Out-of- 
wedlock first 
birth
0.892
0.708
0.560.
0.516
0.438
0.340
0.290
0.231 s
5.27
379
72
Married at 
first birth
0.689
0.558
0.417
0.358
0.274
0.254
0.190
0.1 24a
4.09
445
82
Hispanic
Out-of- 
wedlock first 
birth
0.882
0.815
0.695
0.618
0.487
0.400
0.331
0.233a
5.64
76
72
Married at 
first birth
0.889
0.669
0.549
0.477
0.381
0.284
0.244
0.115a
4.72
63
54
a. Estimate is unreliable since a portion of the sample was exposed to AFDC for less than 8 years, 
b. Population numbers are weighted to reflect national totals.
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Table 3.7 Characteristics (Weighted) of NLSY Women with a First Birth 
in 1978-1982 and Work/Welfare Status in 1988-89, by Welfare 
Participation since First Birth and Marital Status at Time 
of Birth
Out-of-wedlock 
first birth
Ever on Never on 
welfare welfare
Population (OOOs)
Sample size
A. All women with a first birth
Age at first birth (%)
Under 18
18 or 19
20 or more
% Black
% Hispanic
% white
& not H.S. grad at birth of 
first child
% not H.S. grad in 1989
AFQT percentile score
% at or below 10th 
percentile
Months on AFDC, first 
birth thru 1989
% ever married
% worked before first birth
828
461
1978-1982
34.5
39.0
26.5
54.4
9.4
36.1
56.0
32.5
23.5
32.3
47.0
53.9
53.9
Weeks worked in 1978- 
1988 146.0
% worked in 1988 or 1989
% off welfare in 1988 and 
1989
78.3
48.7
274
120
32.5
34.0
33.5
33.5
11.0
55.5
26.5
10.6
34.3
16.9
0.0
71.8
62.4
262.0
84.5
100.0
Married at first birth
Ever on 
welfare
656
248
21.0
35.4
43.6
8.7
10.9
80.4
47.7
31.6
32.5
14.2
25.0
100.0
73.0
193.0
81.5
55.1
Never on 
welfare
2,108
607
8.3
24.8
66.8
5.6
7.8
86.6
21.0
10.8
47.3
7.0
0.0
100.0
83.6
325.0
84.8
100.0
36
Table 3.7 (continued)
Out-of-wedlock 
first birth
Ever on 
welfare
Never on 
welfare
Married at first birth
Ever on 
welfare
Never on 
welfare
B. Off welfare in 1988 and 1989
AFQT percentile score
% at or below 10th 
percentile
Not H.S. grad in 1989
Months on AFDC, first 
birth thru 1989
% ever married
% married in 1989 or 1990
% worked in 1988 or 1989
No. of children
Family income in 1989a
Married
Not married
On welfare in 1989
AFQT percentile score
% at or below 10th 
percentile
Not H.S. grad in 1989
Months on AFDC, first 
birth thru 1989
No. of children
AFDC income, 1989
Family income, 19893
28.1
21.0
23.6
26.0
69.5
53.2
91.7
2.0
$22,349
$30,071
$14,695
18.4
40.8
43.6
71.9
2.4
$4,084
$10,223
34.3
16.9
10.6
0.0
71.8
55.4
84.5
1.7
$24,860
$33,300
$16,199
-
..
--
_
--
--
--
36.1
11.9
35.1
15.5
100.0
75.9
89.5
2.1
$24,120
$29,475
$12,144
28.5
12.7
27.8
40.5
2.3
$3,520
$12,461
47.3
7.0
10.8
0.0
100.0
84.4
84.8
2.2
$36,284
$40,793
$17,578
--
„
-
_
-
--
--
a. Family income includes the income from earnings and other sources of the woman and her 
spouse, if she is married. The reported cash value of foodstamps received is also included in this 
measure.
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during the period from first birth through 1989. Panel B provides data 
on those who left welfare and were off the program for all of 1988 and 
1989. Panel C provides data on those who were on the AFDC program 
in 1989.
It is apparent that women who go on welfare have been low achiev 
ers in other aspects of their lives. Achievement in basic verbal and 
math skills can be measured in the NLSY by scores on the Armed 
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), which was administered to mem 
bers of the NLSY panel. 3 Welfare recipients who bore their first child 
out-of-wedlock (56 percent were in this category), on average, scored 
only at the 23.5th percentile on the AFQT.4 Moreover, close to one- 
third of this group scored at the 10th percentile of the AFQT distribu 
tion, a level of competence so low it would restrict access to many 
jobs. The average AFQT score of welfare recipients who were married 
at the time of their first birth was somewhat higher—at the 32.5th per 
centile—while only 14 percent scored at the 10th percentile. By con 
trast, the average test score of women who were married at first birth 
and never went on welfare was close to the median, and only 7 percent 
scored at or below the 10th percentile.
Although welfare recipients appear to have increased their school 
ing attainment between the time of first birth and 1989, close to one- 
third still had not completed high school. In comparison, only 11 per 
cent of mothers who never were on welfare were high school dropouts 
in 1989.
Mothers who were married at first birth were more likely to have 
worked before their first birth, no doubt in part because they were older 
when their first child was born. Mothers who were ever on welfare 
worked less before their first birth than mothers who never went on 
welfare, and they also worked considerably less during the ten-year 
period preceding 1989. For example, a welfare mother whose child 
was born out-of-wedlock worked 146 weeks over this period, only 45 
percent as much as a married mother who was never on welfare.
The seemingly dismal qualifications of welfare recipients could be 
viewed as evidence that their earning capacity is so low that welfare is 
their only option. But low capacity may also be viewed as a conse 
quence of a nexus of bad decisions. An early out-of-wedlock birth is 
likely to interrupt schooling and detract from academic achievement, 
while going on welfare or anticipating welfare may compound the
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effect. A low AFQT score may, therefore, signal low motivation or 
other problems, including the cumulated effects of exposure to a wel 
fare culture, rather than a pure lack of ability. The true explanation is 
not readily apparent.
Nevertheless, there is another message in table 3.7 that offers some 
optimism. Close to half of the unwed mothers with a first birth in 1978- 
1982, who subsequently went on welfare, were off the rolls in 1988 
and 1989. On average, these mothers had been on AFDC for a total of 
26 months since their first birth. Close to 92 percent worked in 1988 or 
1989, and 53 percent were married (although an even higher number, 
close to 70 percent, had been married at some time). Although the aca 
demic attainment of this group was superior to that of the average per 
son on welfare (three-fourths had completed high school), their mean 
AFQT score was still quite low—in the 28th percentile. Yet, their aver 
age family income was somewhat above $22,000 in 1989, a level equal 
to 194 percent of the poverty line. 5 That average, however, disguises 
some disparity associated with marital status: family income of those 
who were married was $30,000; the income of those who were not 
married was $14,700.
Those who started out as unwed mothers and were observed to be on 
welfare in 1989 were recipients of welfare for about 72 months on 
average since their first birth, a finding that suggests a large proportion 
of the group was almost continuously on the program. Their average 
AFQT score was only at the 18th percentile (40 percent scored below 
the 10th percentile), and 44 percent of the group had never completed 
high school. They also had more children than either married or 
unmarried mothers who were not on welfare. Because they had been 
on welfare for a long period, they were unlikely to have accumulated 
extensive work experience. For all of these reasons they would have 
been more likely to experience employment difficulties in 1989 than 
those who had left welfare.
Unwed mothers who became long-term welfare recipients comprise 
only a relatively small proportion (28.5 percent) of the cohort of 
women who had a first birth in 1978-1982 and subsequently went on 
welfare. Nonetheless, they dominate the AFDC caseload at any point in 
time, and they are a group with multiple problems.
The work-related characteristics of NLSY women who were on 
AFDC in 1989 are shown in table 3.8 and those of 1991 AFDC recipi-
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Table 3.8 Characteristics, Skills, and Work Experience of 24-31-Year-Old 
Women on AFDC in 1989, by Years on Welfare since 1978
(NLSY)
On AFDC more than 
2 years
All women 
on AFDC 
in 1989
% Black
% Hispanic
% white
Age at first birth (%)
17 or less
18 or 19
20 or more
% out-of-wedlock first birth
% southern, age 14
Number of children
In year entered AFDC
In 1989
% high school dropout
In year entered AFDC
In 1989
AFQT percentile (mean)
% at or below the 10th percentile
% went on AFDC within 2 years 
of first birth
% worked before AFDC
Weeks worked by working 
women before going on AFDC
Total months on AFDC since 
1978 (mean)
Weighted population (OOOs)
Sample size
39.1
9.5
51.4
27.4
24.0
47.8
61.3
26.6
1.385
2.229
43.2
33.5
26.0
30.9
42.5
76.2
140.5
57.4
1,123.2
530
On AFDC
2 years or 
less
25.6
6.7
67.8
12.9
12.3
71.9
49.9
32.8
1.562
1.612
27.3
21.5
29.8
31.0
13.8
85.6
293.7
10.0
231.7
87
On AFDC 4 
years or 
Total more
42.7
10.2
47.2
31.1
27.0
41.6
64.3
25.1
1.342
2.389
47.5
36.6
25.3
30.9
49.9
73.8
98.2
69.1
891.4
443
44.0
11.1
44.9
32.1
29.3
38.3
68.5
22.7
1.286
2.426
49.5
37.0
24.5
30.2
52.9
72.2
44.3
75.6
765.4
393
40
Table 3.9 Characteristics, Skills, and Work Experience of 26-33-Year-Old 
Women on AFDC in 1991, by years on Welfare since 1978
(NLSY)
On AFDC more 
than 2 years
AH women 
on AFDC 
in 1991
% Black
% Hispanic
% White
Age at first birth (%)
17 or less
18 or 19
20 or more
% out-of-wedlock first birth
% south, age 14
Number of children
In year entered AFDC
In 1991
% high school dropout
In year entered AFDC
In 1991
AFQT percentile (mean)
% at or below the 10th
percentile
% went on AFDC within 2 years 
of first birth
% worked before AFDC
Weeks worked by working 
women before going on AFDC
Total months on AFDC since
1978 (mean)
Weighted population (OOOs)
Sample size
38.2
9.7
52.1
30.4
20.9
48.8
56.5
27.7
1.42
2.35
43.8
34.9
22.2
36.7
44.4
62.9
115
66.4
1,274
517
On AFDC 2 
years 
or less
22.0
7.6
70.4
13.1
16.1
70.8
45.1
37.9
1.5
1.68
30.4
30.4
24.3
32.1
23.8
78.9
253
10.3
243
83
Total
42.0
10.2
47.8
34.3
22.0
43.7
59.1
25.4
1.4
2.5
47.0
36.0
21.7
37.8
49.2
59.1
92
80
1,033
434
On AFDC
4 years 
or more
43.5
10.2
46.3
35.4
22.3
42.3
61.5
25.4
1.38
2.55
49.1
37.1
21.4
38.9
51.8
56.6
79
85
930
396
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ents are shown in table 3.9. Both tables display characteristics of 
women classified by duration on AFDC (total months in one or more 
spells). To help inform consideration of a time limit, the classifications 
refer to women who were on welfare for two years or less and to 
women who were on welfare for more than two years and for four or 
more years. Because the NLSY sample is composed of fixed birth 
"cohorts," the information shown for 1989 (table 3.8) is limited to 
women ages 24-31, while the data for 1991 refer to women ages 26-33 
years (table 3.9). With the passage of time, those who are observed to 
remain on welfare tend to become an increasingly more disadvantaged 
group, since welfare recipients who have fewer disadvantages are more 
easily employed (or married) and subsequently leave the program.
The difference between the characteristics of long-term participants 
and those who had been on welfare two years or less is similar in both 
1989 and 1991. We refer here to the 1991 profiles in table 3.9. In that 
year, 81 percent of the caseload had been on AFDC for more than two 
years (more than 24 months) and 73 percent for four years or more. On 
average the four-year-and-over group had participated for about seven 
years. More than half had gone on AFDC within 2 years of their first 
birth, and more than 60 percent had borne their first child out of wed 
lock. Their AFQT test scores put them at the bottom of the skill distri 
bution, and although some had completed additional years of schooling 
since first entering AFDC, 37 percent still had not completed high 
school by 1991.
Those with less than two years on AFDC (with an average accumu 
lation of only ten months on the caseload) in many ways had fewer 
handicaps than long-term welfare recipients: They had worked 253 
weeks on average before coming on AFDC and had fewer children (an 
average of 1.7 versus 2.5). Yet their basic skills as measured by AFQT 
scores and schooling are only somewhat better than those of the long- 
term recipients, It appears that, as the cohort ages, the proportion of 
women going on AFDC for the first time declines, but at the same time, 
those who do go on AFDC have fewer basic skills than those who 
remain off the rolls. 6 Future NLSY data will reveal whether the greater 
work experience and smaller family size of these late entrants enable 
them to leave welfare quickly or whether the negative effect of low 
skills dominates and they remain, becoming long-term recipients.
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Work Outcomes of Former Welfare Recipients
A key issue in evaluating a program that imposes a time limit on 
participation is the extent to which persons with the attributes of wel 
fare recipients can actually become self-sufficient. Finding and keep 
ing employment is one component of self-support; the other is the 
wage rate of jobs obtained. The two are related, since work experience 
and the skills acquired on the job have significant positive effects on 
earnings (Mincer and Polachek 1974). Moreover, a woman who stays 
on welfare long term will not only lose the experience she could have 
gained while working, but may also find that skills acquired in school 
or obtained from early work experience have eroded over time (Mincer 
and Ofek 1982). For those reasons, women who leave welfare for work 
are likely to earn less than women who were never on welfare in the 
first place, even if they had similar schooling and AFQT scores. How 
ever, if former recipients persist in the labor force, the gap between 
their earnings and those of other workers never on welfare may narrow 
over time.
In this section we examine the work participation and earnings of 
former AFDC participants and compare them with those of other 
women of the same age and schooling. As shown in table 3.10, former 
welfare recipients (ages 27-34) who were off welfare in 1991 in fact 
worked extensively. Despite their relatively low skills, their work par 
ticipation almost equaled or exceeded that of other mothers never on 
welfare—see table 3.7, columns (2) and (4), In table 3.10, only women 
without children worked more, and this group not only is unencum 
bered by child care concerns but also tends to be more highly educated. 
Among all former welfare recipients in table 3.10, 81 percent worked 
at some time in 1991; and of those who did work, 74 percent worked 
full time, and 44 percent worked full time, year-round. Work participa 
tion was lower for high school dropouts, but not dramatically so—71 
percent of former recipients worked in 1991, and of these, one-third 
worked full time and year-round. Among high school graduates, 84 
percent of former recipients worked, 48 percent full time, year-round.
Among women who were still on welfare, about 44 percent reported 
working, 30 percent for 26 weeks or more, but only 5 percent full time, 
year-round. These are relatively low employment rates compared to
Table 3.10 Work Experience in 1991 of NLSY Women Ages 27-34 by Marital and Fertility Status, Welfare History, 
and Education
With children3
Ever on AFDCa
All women
All women
Sample size 4,535
Population (OOOs) 16,486
Working in 1991 (%)
Among workers, percent working
28 weeks or more
Full time
Full time, 50-52 weeks
Less than high school grad
Population (OOOs)
Working in 1991 (%)
Among workers, percent working
26 weeks or more
Full time
Full time, 50-52 weeks
82.0
88.1
73.4
52.0
1,713
60.1
74.6
65.3
31.4
Without 
children
1,300
5,169
93.5
93.9
86.7
67.4
286
70.4
77.9
64.6
45.3
Currently 
married
2,002
8,077
77.8
86.1
62.9
42.7
739
61.8
79.0
66.8
31.8
Not currently 
married
1,223
3,241
74.1
81.9
74.0
45.1
688
54.0
67.3
63.7
23.3
Total
1,158
3,027
65.8
74.2
68.7
33.0
866
53.2
69.5
63.2
23.5
OffAFDCin 
1991
651
1,776
80.9
88.0
74.3
43,7
434
70.8
84.0
69.3
32.7
On AFDC in 
1991
507
1,251
44.4
38.7
54.0
5.3
432
35.4
40.4
51.1
5.1 
(continued)
Table 3.10 (continued)
With children3
Ever on AFDCa
All women
High school grad
Population (OOOs) 7,163
Working in 1991 (%) 80.7
Among workers, percent working
26 weeks or more 86.2
Full time 72.5
Full time, 50-52 weeks 50.0
College, 1-3 years 3,957
Working in 199 1 (%) 86.4
Among workers, percent working
26 weeks or more 90.5
Full time 72.4
Full time, 50-52 weeks 52.4
College grad
Population (OOOs) 3,653
Working in 1991 (%) 90.2
Without 
children
1,727
92.9
92.9
85.8
65.7
1,251
94.8
93.7
84.6
65.4
1,906
96.7
Currently 
married
3,766
77.2
84.5
62.6
42.0
2,001
81.2
88.7
64.0
44.3
1,571
82.5
Not currently 
married
1,670
75.9
81.7
78.3
48.4
705
86.2
8.8.9
71.1
48.9
176
87.5
OffAFDCin 
Total 1991
1,506
69.5
73.8
71.5
35.3
586
74.1
79.6
67.1
37.3
70
74.0
881
83.7
88.4
78.6
48.0
415
84.3
89.6
70.2
44.4
46
91.8
On AFDC in 
1991
625
49.4
38.7
54.5
5.0
171
49.3
38.0
54.5
7.6
23
38.8
Among workers, percent working
26 weeks or more 93.3 93.7 88.8 91.8 81.8 95.4 17.8 
Full time 78.6 84.6 61.0 85.0 72.8 70.8 82.2 
Full time, 5052 weeks______61.4______65.4______45.9______56.0______37.0______44.8______0.0 
a. Mothers who were never on welfare are not shown separately.
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those of the average mother, although they greatly exceed the figure of 
6 or 7 percent reported to county welfare boards in recent years (see 
table 2.2).
The annual earnings in 1991 and hourly wage rates in 1992 of 
former and present welfare recipients and of other NLS Y women never 
on welfare are given in tables 3.11 and 3.12, respectively. The former 
recipients earned only $12,951, on average, during 1991 although 
annual income rose to $16,372 if they worked full time, year-round. 
These incomes are lower than the earnings of all married women with 
children (both those ever on and those never on welfare), although the 
difference narrows when the comparison is made within educational 
groupings. Differences in annual earnings may arise because of differ 
ences in the total time worked during the year (total hours worked may 
vary even among full-time, year-round workers) and/or differences in 
hourly wages. As indicated in table 3.12, the hourly pay of former wel 
fare recipients averaged $7.43 in 1992, only 77 percent as much as 
married mothers earned and 66 percent as much as women without 
children. At the high school graduate level, former recipients' wage 
rates averaged 90 percent of married women's wages. Current AFDC 
recipients earn the lowest wages (even standardized for schooling).
Differences in hourly pay between former and current welfare recip 
ients and other women could be attributable to differences in lifetime 
work experience, since welfare recipients work much less than other 
women. When employment is more sporadic, the jobs held are less 
likely to provide on-the-job training and to build skills with an earnings 
payoff later on. The lower AFQT skills of welfare recipients are also 
likely to reduce their level of pay relative to nonrecipients, particularly 
during recent years when the payoff from cognitive skills has increased 
(O'Neill 1990b). Differences in geographic region and in the number 
of children are other factors with a potential impact on pay differences.
To begin to understand the determinants of the wage rates that 
former welfare recipients receive and that current recipients might 
anticipate, we have conducted multivariate analyses of hourly wage 
rates, the results of which are shown in tables 3.13 and 3.14. The main 
findings of interest are as follows.
• In addition to the education and skill deficiencies of welfare recipi 
ents already considered, former and current welfare recipients 
worked 74 percent as many weeks as women never on welfare in
Table 3.11 Mean Annual Wage and Salary Income in 1991, NLSY Women Ages 27-34 in 1992, by Marital and 
Fertility Status, Welfare History, and Education (in 1992 dollars)
Women with children3
Ever on AFDCa
All women
All workers
All women
H.S. dropout
H.S. graduate
Some college
College graduate
Full-time year-round workers
All women
H.S. dropout
H.S. graduate
Some college
College graduate
$18,867
10,881
15,189
18,678
27,284
$24,347
16,680
19,836
23,271
32,886
Women 
without 
children
$23,780
16,674
18,063
21,831
30,219
$27,240
—
21,121
24,414
33,704
Currently 
married
$16,727
10,718
14,158
17,325
23,683
$22,919
14,982
19,735
22,815
31,748
Not currently 
married
$14058
8,146
13,828
15,979
19,874
$19,146
12,127
17,862
21,349
27,714
Total
$10,912
8,387
11,071
12,568
12,949
$16,043
13,699
15,636
17,684
—
Off AFDC 
in 1991
$12,951
10,396
12,990
14,230
—
$16,372
14,494
15,871
17,890
—
On AFDC 
in 1991
$4,572
3,388
5,409
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
NOTE: Incomes are not shown in cases with fewer than 25 individuals in the sample and are calculated only for women with earnings in 1991. 
a. Earnings for women with children who were never on welfare are not shown.
Table 3.12 Hourly Rate of Pay in 1992, NLSY Women Ages 27-34 in 1992, by Marital and Fertility Status, Welfare 
History, and Education
Women with children3
Ever on AFDCa
All workers
All women
H.S. dropout
H.S. graduate
Some college
College graduate
All women
$ 9.92
6.53
8.13
10.18
13.79
Women 
without 
children
$11.20
6.98
8.71
10.79
14.04
Currently 
married
$ 9.70
6.72
8.13
10.19
13.72
Not currently 
married
$ 7.86
6.04
7.37
8.95
11.43
Total
$ 6.90
5.94
6.69
7.74
10.71
OffAFDC 
in 1991
$7.43
6.18
7.31
8.32
—
On AFDC 
in 1991
$5.48
5.45
5.14
5.38
—
NOTE: Incomes are not shown in cases with fewer than 25 individuals in the sample and are calculated only for women with earnings in 1991. 
a. Earnings for women with children who were never on welfare are not shown.
Table 3.13 Determinants of Log Hourly Wage Rate, Regression Results for NLSY Women with Children by Welfare 
Participation over Their Lifetimes
Ever on welfare
Independent variables
Intercept
Number of children
Age, 1990
Black
Hispanic
South
Urban and SMSA
Unemployment rate 
(local labor market)
Schooling
0-8 (omitted)
9-11
12
13-15
Table 3.13 (continued)
(1) 
Coefficient
1.5258
0.0037
-0.0070
0.0574
0.1484
-0.1860
0.0830
-0.0011
-0.0365
0.0112
0.1191
T-statistic
6.911
0.245
-0.988
1.326
2.741
-5.263
2.337
-0.120
-0.466
0.148
1.421
Never on welfare
(2) 
Coefficient
1.3264
-0.0183
0.0001
0.0604
0.1275
-0.1012
0.0804
-0.0169
-0.0501
-0.0146
0.0694
T-statistic
9.724
-1.923
0.020
2.450
5.010
-5.710
4.132
-3.302
-0.782
-0.268
1.230
Variable means
Ever on 
welfare
1.000
2.061
29.209
0.463
0.120
0.381
0.662
5.934
0.205
0.520
0.202
Never on 
welfare
1.000
0.935
29.095
0.203
0.153
0.414
0.705
5.474
0.048
0.413
0.252
(continued)
Ever on welfare
Independent variables
16+
Weeks worked
1986-90
1980-85
Worked full time
Ever armed forces
Currently married
Never married
AFQT percentile score
Adj. R-square
Mean, log hourly wage rate
Sample size
Coefficient
0.2288
0.0013
0.0000
0.0604
0.0793
0.0820
0.0663
0.0024
0
1
(1) 
T-statistic
1.839
5.762
0.076
1.720
0.650
1.943
1.595
2.641
.1751
.7375
742
Never on welfare
(2) 
Coefficient T-statistic
0.2672
0.0018
0.0004
0.1203
0.1212
0.0278
0.0230
0.0035
0.2905
2.0878
2.807
4.587
11.367
3.256
5.555
1.574
1.276
0.826
8.266
Variable means
Ever on 
welfare
0.028
148.900
102.517
0.734
0.016
0.381
0.343
26.529
Never on 
welfare
0.262
212.406
194.635
0.799
0.012
0.584
0.141
46.298
Table 3.14 Determinants of Log Hourly Wage Rate, Regression Results for NLSY Women with Children
All women with children
Independent variables
Intercept
Number of children
Age, 1990
Black
Hispanic
South
Urban and SMSA
Unemployment rate 
(local labor market)
Ever on welfare
Schooling
0-8 (omitted)
9-11
12
13-15
(1) 
Coefficient
1.3863
-0.0597
0.0265
0.0207
0.0418
-0.1397
0.1011
-0.0140
-0.2400
T-statistic
9.622
-4.895
5.603
0.776
1.347
-6.186
4.257
-2.315
-9.950
(2) 
Coefficient
1.3479
-0.0059
0.0023
0.648
0.1362
-0.1262
0.0708
-0.0121
-0.0671
-0.0645
-0.0102
0.0831
T-statistic
9.126
-0.501
0.481
2.255
4.505
-6.005
3.235
-2.160
-2.615
-1.106
-0.191
1.441
Variable means
1.000
1.895
29.425
0.288
0.159
0.429
0.667
5.718
0.320
0.109
0.501
0.232
(continued)
Table 3.14 (continued)
Independent variables
16+
Weeks worked
1986-90
1980-85
Worked full time
Ever armed forces
Currently married
Never married
AFQT percentile score
Adj. R-square
Mean, log hourly wage rate
Sample size
All women with children
(1) (2) 
Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient
0.2638
0.0015
0.0002
0.0898
0.0792
0.0421
0.0428
0.0029
0.1089 0.2532
1.9165 1.9165
2,192 2,192
T-statistic
4.093
9.576
1.801
4.037
0.982
1.294
1.239
5.470
Variable means
0.122
185.100
166.698
0.725
0.015
0.653
0.208
37.600
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the years 1986 through 1990 and 54 percent as many weeks in the 
preceding period, 1980 through 1985.
•The payoff to additional schooling, particularly for schooling 
beyond high school is similar for women who have been on wel 
fare and women who have never been on welfare. The return to 
higher AFQT scores is large and highly significant for both the 
welfare and nonwelfare groups, but the effect is larger for those 
who were never on welfare.
• The payoff to additional weeks worked in the 1986-1990 period is 
large and significant for both groups, although somewhat greater 
for those never on welfare. Additional work experience in the 
1980-1985 period had no impact on later wages for women who 
had been on welfare, although it had a positive and significant 
effect (but smaller than for the later period) among those never on 
welfare.
• When all women are combined in a single analysis, the net effect 
of having been on welfare can be measured using a variable indi 
cating welfare status. As shown in table 3.14, when we control for 
no personal characteristics other than age, race and number of chil 
dren, women ever on welfare are found to earn approximately 24 
percent less than women who were never on welfare. After control 
ling for the full array of variables including weeks worked over the 
past few years, schooling, and AFQT score, the pay differential is 
sharply reduced to around 7 percent.
These results are encouraging in some ways, since they suggest that 
women with a welfare background who acquire skills and work experi 
ence and are motivated to work can expect to get a significant payoff in 
the market as a result of their efforts. Yet the gap in skills related to 
years of schooling and academic achievement (as measured by AFQT 
scores) may be extremely difficult to close. Moreover, the factors 
responsible for welfare in the first place may not be easily reversed.
NOTES
1. The number of AFDC recipients appears to be underreported in the CPS, although the pat 
tern of receipt by age and other characteristics appears to be very similar to that shown in other 
data sources. See appendix A for further discussion.
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2. Since the table uses data from the NLSY, it is limited to women ages 14-22 in 1979. More 
over, the observed durations are limited by the number of years covered by the survey, which at 
present includes a potential maximum of fourteen years of welfare use.
3. The AFQT has a long history as a reliable indicator of skills and has been used by the 
Armed Forces for years to determine eligibility for service.
4. Because the test was administered at the same point in time for all NLSY respondents, the 
scores vary because of differences in age. The scores shown have been statistically adjusted for 
age variation.
5. The poverty line used for this calculation is the average of the poverty lines for a two-child 
family of three and a two-child family of four, since about half of the former recipients were mar 
ried in 1989. Note that the NLSY definition of income includes the reported cash value of food 
stamps received. However, food stamps were a minor portion of this group's income, adding an 
average of only $170 to total income for the year.
6. The difference between recent entrants and long-term recipients is larger at younger ages. 
See appendix table B.I for 1987 results when the cohort was ages 22-29. In that year, for example, 
the mean AFQT score of those with two years or less on AFDC was 10 percentage points higher 
than for those with longer-term participation.
CHAPTER
The Effectiveness of Education, Work, 
and Training Programs for Reducing 
Welfare Dependence
The idea that education, work, and training programs could be used 
to improve the employability of welfare recipients has guided govern 
ment efforts to move recipients off the welfare rolls since at least 1965, 
when President Lyndon B. Johnson wrote:
Many recipients of public assistance are capable of training which 
would ultimately make them self-supporting. I therefore urge the 
Congress to make permanent the Unemployed Parent and Com 
munity Work and Training Programs associated with the Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and to require states 
receiving federal support under AFDC to cooperate in making 
Community Work and Training available for the unemployed par 
ents of dependent children. (Economic Report of the President 
1967).
In 1988, Congress reiterated these beliefs when it passed the Family 
Support Act, which created the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills 
(JOBS) training program. As explained by a General Accounting 
Office (GAO) report:
The (JOBS) program is intended to transform the nation's welfare 
system b re-focusing the role it plays in helping families in pov 
erty. JOBS requires states to provide parents and teens receiving 
aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) the education, 
training, work experience and supportive services they need to 
move toward self-sufficiency and help avoid long-term welfare 
dependence. JOBS embodies a new consensus that the well-being 
of children depends not only on meeting their material needs but
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also on the parents' ability to become economically self-sufficient 
(GAO 1991).
It is clear from these two quotes, over 20 years apart, that the policy 
community has held to the belief that welfare recipients and their fami 
lies can be made self-supporting if they are provided with appropriate 
education, work, and training programs. But what has been the actual 
impact of these programs on the work effort of participants and on the 
size of the AFDC caseload? The preceding chapter showed that a sig 
nificant fraction of AFDC mothers eventually leave the program. 
Therefore, the question needing to be addressed concerns the extent to 
which government programs have made a contribution to the outflow 
that would not have occurred in their absence. Based on the review in 
this chapter, the overall conclusion we reach is that these programs 
have had minimal effects on welfare participation over time. The 
observed flows off the AFDC program among participants in employ 
ment and training programs do not appear to have been significantly 
greater than for similar AFDC mothers who did not participate in such 
programs.
This section provides an evaluative survey of the major employment 
and training programs that have been applied to welfare recipients over 
the past twenty-five years. An important caveat in interpreting the 
results of this review is that all past programs took place in an environ 
ment in which there was no limit on the time an otherwise eligible fam 
ily could remain on welfare. In recent years, many AFDC recipients 
have been required to participate in programs and were frequently sub 
ject to the sanction of temporary partial benefit loss if they did not 
comply. However, if a welfare recipient completed a program and then 
was unable to become self-supporting, she could remain on welfare 
indefinitely. Faced with a time limit, a recipient might well become 
more motivated to succeed and therefore utilize her training and 
employment opportunities more effectively than would have been the 
case without a time limit. Our finding that the program did not enhance 
the recipients' earnings rates or upgrade their occupations may have 
been due partly to lack of motivation by the recipient. Thus, our nega 
tive conclusions about the effectiveness of past programs may not nec 
essarily apply to a situation where welfare recipients are faced with a 
mandatory time limit.
Lessons for Welfare Reform 57
For purposes of this review, we group all education, work, and train 
ing programs into three categories: (1) education and training services 
aimed primarily at more mature women with school-age children; (2) 
programs of education and special services designed especially for 
teenage mothers who have recently entered AFDC; and (3) mandatory 
"workfare" or work-experience programs. The first two categories con 
tain programs that, for the most part, attempted to raise the labor mar 
ket productivity of the AFDC participant through education, training, 
and other supportive services. Programs in the third category operated 
on two levels. First, they may have reduced the caseload by making 
welfare less attractive, since the recipient was required to devote a sig 
nificant portion of time to working at a specified location with no 
increase in benefits. Second, they may have had positive effects on the 
recipient's productivity in a manner similar to the programs in the first 
two categories.
Education, Work, and Training Programs for Post-Teenage 
Mothers
Following smaller efforts in the early 1960s, the Work Incentive 
(WIN) program, established in 1967 became the first large-scale 
employment and training program for AFDC recipients. When welfare 
caseloads continued to rise, more stringent participation requirements 
were added, and immediate job placement took precedence over train 
ing for jobs (WIN II). At its height in 1975, WIN costs totaled about 
$314 million, which is close to $900 million in today's dollars. But as 
the high hopes for the program went unfulfilled, WIN funding was not 
increased in line with inflation during the late 1970s.
An important change was made in the program under the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA). This act authorized states 
to conduct their own WIN demonstration projects as an alternative to 
the standard WIN program. Community Work Experience Programs 
(CWEP) were established, and many states tightened their work 
requirements. Experience with these OBRA demonstration projects led 
to the passage of legislation to establish the Family Support Act (FSA) 
of 1988. The JOBS program, authorized by FSA and required to be
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implemented in all states by 1990, replaced WIN and stressed both 
remedial and basic education, as well as training in job skills. JOBS 
became the framework for providing training services to AFDC recipi 
ents. Over the years, many program evaluations using various method 
ologies have been conducted. One review of the many OBRA 
demonstration projects evaluated by the Manpower Demonstration 
Research Corporation (MDRC) concluded as follows: 1
The major finding of the MDRC studies is that welfare-to-work 
programs usually produce the desired type of effects. In most 
demonstrations, earnings and employment increased; frequently, 
but not as dependably, welfare payments and welfare participation 
declined. Typically, the magnitudes of these effects were quite 
small, particularly regarding welfare receipt (O'Neill 1993).
We come to a similar conclusion after examining the evaluations of 
four more recent employment and training demonstration projects 
started under OBRA in the mid- and late 1980s. Table 4.1 provides a 
description of the four programs—their sites, dates, and basic features. 
Three of the projects—the Saturation Work Initiative Model (SWIM) 
in San Diego, the Great Avenues for Independence Program (GAIN) in 
six California counties, and Project Independence (PI) in nine Florida 
counties—were mandatory for AFDC recipients with school-age chil 
dren, with monetary sanctions applied for nonparticipation. The fourth 
project—The Family Independence Plan (FIP) established in 15 coun 
ties in Washington State—provided approximately the same range of 
education, work, and training services as SWIM, GAIN, and Project 
Independence. It differed from them in two significant ways, however:
(1) special monetary work incentives were built into the program, and
(2) no sanctions were applied for nonparticipation.
In the FIP program, participants assigned to an experimental group 
received cash bonuses for enrolling in the services offered, such as 
remedial schooling and/or a training program, and an even larger cash 
bonus was provided if they took a paid job. Consequently, a FIP partic 
ipant could work and receive, in earnings plus the FIP cash bonus, an 
amount that would have disqualified her from welfare benefits under 
the standard AFDC rules. FIP utilized increased marginal work incen 
tives, an approach that had been removed from the AFDC program by 
the 1981 OBRA Amendments noted above (see O'Neill 1993).
Table 4.1 Features of Four Recent Education-Training Programs
Name
Saturation Work Incentive 
Model (SWIM)
Greater Avenues for 
Independence (GAIN)
Projected Independence (PI)
Family Independence Plan 
(FIP)
Location
San Diego
6 counties in California, 
including Los Angeles
9 counties in Florida, 
including Miami
15 counties in 
Washington State
When 
program 
started
July 1985
1985
1987
1988
Period of 
follow-up 
evaluation
1985 to 1991
1989 to 1992
August 1991 
to July 1992
June 1990 to 
June 1992
Mandatory 
participation and 
sanctions
Yes
Yes
Yes
No (positive 
financial incentive 
to participate)
Services 
provided
Job search, basic 
education, training
Job search, basic 
education, training
Job search, basic 
education, training, 
JOB Club
Education and 
training
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Two evaluations of the net impacts of FIP (Leigh 1993; Long and 
Wissoker 1992) found that the program had the perverse effect of actu 
ally increasing the welfare caseload. Two and three years after FIP 
started in 1988, the rate of participation in AFDC was much higher 
among FIP participants than among similar AFDC recipients who had 
not participated in FIP. The AFDC mothers who did not participate in 
FIP received no cash bonus for working, and their earnings were sub 
ject to the official AFDC rules, which only allowed deductions for cer 
tain work expenses and a time-limited income disregard (see above) 
before reducing benefit amounts dollar for dollar. Thus, it appears that 
incentives may increase rather than decrease welfare caseloads. (See 
the discussion in chapter 2 and the analysis in chapter 5).
Unlike FIP, the SWIM and GAIN programs did not utilize earnings 
disregards, and they provided for monetary sanctions (reduced AFDC 
monthly benefit amounts) if an eligible recipient refused to participate. 
SWIM provided job-search training for two weeks, followed by three 
months in a work-experience program if no job was found during job 
search. Those still unemployed after completing their work-experience 
segment were assessed and referred to community education and train 
ing programs. GAIN provided for initial testing and screening to find 
those who might benefit from basic and remedial education. Those 
who did not need basic education started in job-search training activi 
ties and then proceeded through a cycle similar to the SWIM program.
SWIM and GAIN have undergone evaluations conducted by the 
Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC). The 
MDRC evaluations utilized the methodology of a controlled experi 
ment in which individual recipients were assigned randomly to experi 
mental and control groups (Friedlander, Riccio, and Freedman 1993; 
Friedlander and Hamilton 1993). MDRC reported that GAIN and 
SWIM had positive impacts, similar in magnitude to those found for 
earlier programs operated under WIN and the early OBRA demonstra 
tions.
These positive impacts included modest increases in annual earn 
ings and modest reductions in AFDC benefit amounts, along with 
smaller effects on rates of program participation. The increases in 
annual earnings, however, (measured by the observed difference 
between experimentals and controls) were almost entirely due to 
increases in the amount of time worked during the year. No significant
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differences were found in earnings rates per quarter between experi- 
mentals and controls in either SWIM or GAIN. Thus, the programs 
were unlikely to have had any impact on the long-term earnings capac 
ity of the AFDC recipients who participated. This finding helps explain 
why only very small effects were found with respect to welfare partici 
pation. Larger reductions in program participation would have required 
substantial impacts on the earnings rates, and probably on the occupa 
tions, of the participants.
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 present information on the annual earnings and 
quarterly earnings of experimentals and controls for the SWIM and 
GAIN projects, as reported by the MDRC. It is clear from the tables 
that in most comparisons the impact of either SWIM or GAIN on earn 
ings rates (i.e. earnings per quarter of employment) were very small. 
(In SWIM the effect on annual earnings declined sharply over time, 
and the effect on earnings rates was as often negative as it was posi 
tive.) Even the very large percentage increase in annual earnings in the 
Riverside GAIN project was almost entirely due to increases in the 
amount of time worked per year by the experimentals. The effects of 
GAIN, it should be noted, varied widely among the six sites; in Los 
Angeles and Tulare no positive impacts could be claimed.
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 present data comparing experimentals and con 
trols with respect to rates of participation in AFDC. While SWIM and 
GAIN appear to have reduced welfare participation, the effect was not 
very large and appears to have narrowed with time in the program. If 
we average over all the comparisons for all the quarters shown in 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5, we get a reduction of approximately 4 percentage 
points. This is the amount by which the AFDC participation rate of 
experimentals was less than that of the controls, on average. However, 
by the last quarter shown, this effect was much diminished.
The Project Independence (PI) program was started in Florida in 
1987 as its statewide welfare-to-work program. In 1988, after passage 
of the Family Security Act, it became Florida's official JOBS program. 
Like SWIM and GAIN, participation in PI was mandatory, with sanc 
tions used to punish noncooperative behavior. Also like SWIM and 
GAIN, PI provided job-search, occupational training, and basic educa 
tion components. Each participant was assessed and either assigned 
directly to job-search, or first to basic education or training and then to
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Table 4.2 Average Annual Earnings and Average Earnings per Quarter 
Employed for Experimentals and Controls by Follow-Up 
Period, Single-Parent Family Heads Only (SWIM Program)
Follow-up period
Quarter5
2-5
6-9
10-13
14- 17
18-21
2-5
6-9
10- 13
14- 17
18-21
Experimentals Controls Percent difference
Average annual earnings3
$2,029 $1,678
2,892 2,248
3,287 2,732
3,775 3,397
4,126 3,987
Average earnings per quarter employed
$1,536 $1,629
2,056 2,012
2,391 2,424
2,816 2,712
3,100 3,108
21.0
28.6
20.3
11.1
3.7
(-5.8)
2.2
(-2.2)
3.9
(-0.3)
SOURCE: Friedlander and Hamilton 1993.
a. All averages combine the earnings of those who worked with zeros for those who did not work.
If the average earnings per quarter are multiplied by four they equal what the average person who
did work would have earned if he had worked a full year.
b. Quarters after the random assignment month.
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Table 4.3 Average Annual Earnings and Average Earnings per Quarter 
Employed for Experimentals and Controls by Follow-Up 
Period, Single-Parent Family Heads (GAIN Program by 
County Location)
Follow-up period 
and county Experimentals Controls
Percent 
difference
Alameda
Year! 
Year 2
Yearl 
Year 2 
Butte
Yearl 
Year 2
Yearl 
Year 2 
Los Angeles
Yearl 
Year 2
Yearl
Year 2
Riverside
Yearl 
Year 2
Yearl 
Year 2
Average annual earnings
$1,421 $1,212 17.2 
2,132 1,609 32.5 
Average earnings per quarter employed
$1,894 $1,782 6.2
2,479 2,265 9.4
Average annual earnings
$2,001 $1,729 15.7 
2,996 2,442 22.6 
Average earnings per quarter employed
$1,924 $1,746 10.1
2,390 2,220 7.6
Average annual earnings
$1,304 $1,308 (-)O.l 
1,694 1,582 7.0 
Average earnings per quarter employed
$1,889 $2,404 (-)22.5
2,258 2,361 (-)4.4
Average annual earnings
$2,470 $2,550 59.3 
3,414 2,234 52.8 
Average earnings per quarter employed 
$843 $1,845 (-)0.2 
1,404 2,303 4.4
(continued)
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Table 4.3 (continued)
Follow-up period 
and county
San Diego
Yearl
Year 2
Yearl
Year 2
Tulare
Yearl
Year 2
Yearl
Year 2
Percent 
Experimentals Controls difference
Average annual earnings
$2,462 $2,113 16.5
3,503 2,794 25.4
Average earnings per quarter employed
$2,081 $2,031 (-)0.7
2,654 2,494 6.4
Average annual earnings
$1,792 $1,941 (-)7.7
2,532 2,498 1.4
Average earnings per quarter employed
$1,792 $1,866 (-)4.0
2,220 2,210 0.4
SOURCE: Friedlander, Riccio, and Freedman 1993.
Table 4.4 AFDC Participation by Follow-Up Period for Experimentals 
and Controls, Single-Parent Families (SWIM Project)
Percent not receiving AFDC Benefits
Follow-up period3
Quarter
2-5
6-9
10-13
14-17
18-21
Experimentals
23.7
44.2
54.0
61.2
65.9
Controls
19.9
36.9
48.1
57.5
63.9
SOURCE: Friedlander and Hamilton 1993.
a. Quarters after random assignment to program.
Table 4.5 Receipt Status, by Follow-Up Period, for Experimentals and Controls, Single-Parent-Families, GAIN 
Project by County Location (percent still on AFDC)
Follow- 
up Alameda
period3 Exp. Cont.
Quarter
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
97.0
94.1
89.8
86.0
83.3
82.3
78.8
76.6
98.0
94.8
91.3
89.2
86.8
83.5
79.9
77.1
Butte 
Exp. Cont.
88.6
79.8
70.7
65.0
60.8
56.2
51.9
49.4
46.8
43.2
89.4
76.4
70.6
68.4
63.8
56.7
52.7
47.4
48.6
45.3
Los Angeles 
Exp. Cont.
95.7
91.8
88.9
84.8
81.8
79.0
76.8
74.0
71.5
69.6
95.5
94.6
91.6
88.0
85.7
82.5
79.5
76.3
74.1
71.2
Riverside 
Exp. Cont.
89.4
75.8
66.1
58.7
54.7
51.8
49.1
46.7
45.0
43.1
89.2
79.6
72.6
65.9
61.1
57.0
55.1
52.0
50.4
49.5
San Diego 
Exp. Cont.
94.1
83.3
74.8
69.1
63.9
60.3
58.3
56.0
53.8
52.2
50.4
94.7
85.6
77.9
72.1
67.5
65.7
63.7
61.1
58.0
55.6
53.9
Tulare 
Exp. Cont.
94.3
87.0
81.0
76.7
72.3
68.5
66.2
65.4
93.6
86.7
81.0
75.0
71.6
68.7
64.4
62.2
SOURCE: Friedlander, Riccio, and Freedman 1993. 
a. Quarters after random assignment to program.
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job-search. During the 1990-1991 period, the average participation in 
PI was eight months.
PI underwent a comprehensive evaluation by MDRC (Kemple and 
Haimson 1994). Table 4.6 summarizes the main findings on program 
impacts one year after recipients were randomly assigned to the pro 
gram. The results are very similar to those found in GAIN and SWIM 
at the same follow-up point—that is, some positive effects that are 
nonetheless small and may be found to be transitory. If the general 
magnitude of the caseload effect shown for the GAIN, SWIM, and PI 
programs is taken at face value, the reduction in the AFDC caseload 
implied by an effect of this magnitude is about 3 percent if all AFDC 
recipients are put through the program.
Table 4.6 First Year Impacts on Average Earnings of Those Who Worked 
and AFDC Participation (Project Independence)
Outcome and Percentage 
follow-up period Program group Control Group___difference
Average earnings ($)
Quarter 2 507 484 4.7
3 642 579 10.9
4 678 648 4.6
5 713 673 5.9
Average earnings of those 
who worked
Quarter 2
3
4
5
1,389
1,725
1,852
1,953
1,432
1,668
1,857
1,962
O3.1
3.4
(-)10.3
(-)10.5
AFDC participation (percent
Quarter 2
3
4
5
79.6
72.2
66.7
64.3
81.7
76.3
71.6
68.6
2.6
5.4
6.8
6.3
SOURCE: Kemple and Haimson 1994.
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However, this calculation assumes that all AFDC mothers could 
benefit from a SWIM-, GAIN-, or Pi-type program in the same way as 
AFDC mothers in the experimental groups, which is very unlikely. 
Moreover, as we discuss below, the impact evaluation methodology 
used by MDRC assigns credit to the program's services for any case 
load-reducing effect that is due solely to the mandatory aspect of the 
program.2 Thus, if a recipient who is working "off the books" leaves 
AFDC when she is mandated to participate in the training program, she 
would be counted by MDRC as benefiting from the program's services. 
This practice may overstate the effect of the program services them 
selves in reducing welfare participation. To the extent that some por 
tion of the observed caseload reduction is due to this "mandatory 
assignment" effect, it would mean that education and training services 
by themselves had less impact on aggregate caseload reductions, 
although the exact amount of impact cannot be discerned from the 
evaluations conducted.
In sum, the provision of employment and training programs, even in 
their most recent manifestations (FIP, SWIM, GAIN, and PI), appears 
to have had only a small impact on reductions in welfare dependence. 
Whether these programs would be more effective if combined with a 
two-year limit is an open question.
Education and Other Services Especially for Teenage Mothers
Our longitudinal analysis (chapter 3) indicated that teenagers who 
bear a child out-of- wedlock have a very high probability of going on 
welfare and of becoming long-term welfare recipients. Therefore, 
interest is particularly high in focusing services on this group of wel 
fare mothers. They were one of three special target groups identified by 
Congress in the JOBS program legislation. 3
Most of the programs designed for teenage welfare mothers have 
aimed to get dropouts back to school (or to help those who did not drop 
out to stay in school) with the hope that they would eventually graduate 
with a high school diploma or GED. The individual recipient was typi 
cally assigned to a case manager, whose job was to help the young girl 
succeed in fulfilling the goals of the program. In addition to high
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school graduation, these goals usually included birth control counsel 
ing, instruction in the care of her child, personal skills development, 
and introduction to the world of work. Usually local public facilities 
were utilized for these additional service elements.
Programs of this type have been provided as large demonstration 
projects under WIN and OBRA, as well as parts of ongoing social wel 
fare programs mainly funded by state and local governments. For 
example, in New York State a caseworker program has tried to reach all 
teenagers who gave birth and registered with the AFDC program, 
either as "case heads" or as dependent teen parents.
Two important programs started in the early and mid-1980s— 
Project Redirection and the Teenage Parent Demonstration Project— 
have been the subject of evaluation studies that measure program 
impacts several years after participants have left the program. Other 
important programs aimed at young AFDC mothers have been Ohio's 
Learning, Earning and Parenting Program (LEAP) and the New 
Chance program evaluated by MDRC (see table 4.7). The LEAP and 
New Chance programs are more recent and have not yet been subject 
to comprehensive postprogram outcome evaluations.
Project Redirection
This project was begun in 1980 under the auspices of the Ford Foun 
dation and the WIN program. It operated from 1980 through 1982 and 
served about 800 teen mothers at four program sites in Boston, New 
York City, Phoenix, and Riverside, California. About 72 percent of the 
participating mothers were receiving AFDC benefits when they began 
the program, and the average participant stayed in the program for 
about one year. A nonexperimental comparison group was selected by 
sampling poor teenage mothers in other similar locales with approxi 
mately the same set of personal characteristic as the girls in the Project 
Redirection program. The MDRC analysis shows that the comparison 
group of girls did receive some services that were similar to those 
offered by Project Redirection, but not in the same quantities (Polit, 
Quint and Riccio 1988).
Impact surveys were conducted two years and five years after partic 
ipants had begun the Project Redirection program; members of the 
comparison group were also followed-up over the same time period.
Table 4.7 Special Programs for Teenage Mothers in AFDC
Program
Project Redirection
Location
Four sites: Boston,
Time period 
of program
1980 - 1982
Time period 
of follow-up
1982 - 1985
Mandatory 
participation 
and sanctions
No
Services
Case managei
provided
", secondary
Teenage Parent 
Demonstration 
Project (TPDP)
Learning, Earning 
and Parenting 
Program (LEAP)
New Chance
NYC, Phoenix, and 
Riverside, CA
Camden and Newark, 
NJ and Chicago
1987 - 1991 1989 - 1993
Ohio (statewide) 1989 - on-going 1980 - 1994
Nationwide 
Selected cities: 16 
locations in 10 states
1989-1991 1991-1993
education, special classes in 
birth control, child care, life 
problems, etc.
Yes Case manager, secondary 
education. Workshops in 
personal skills, child 
support, family planning, 
health and nutrition, life 
skills, etc.
Yes Case manager, secondary 
education
No Case manager, secondary 
education. Health-related 
services, services to benefit 
children of teen mothers, 
employment-related 
services.
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Since the average length of stay in Project Redirection was one year, 
follow-up information was generally gathered from one to four years 
after program termination.
Four main outcomes are reported for both the Project Redirection 
participants and the comparison group: educational attainment, 
employment, welfare dependence, and subsequent pregnancies and live 
births. With respect to educational attainment and employment, no sig 
nificant differences were found between participants and the compari 
son group. The results for welfare dependence were puzzling. At the 
two-year follow-up point, Project Redirection participants had an 
AFDC participation rate 7 percentage points above that of comparison 
group members (75 percent vs. 68 percent). But at the five-year point, 
the difference reversed and Project Redirection participants showed a 
lower rate of participation than the comparison group—49 percent vs. 
59 percent. Finally, with regard to subsequent fertility, the five-year 
follow-up reveals the same mean number of subsequent pregnancies 
(about 3) for both groups, but more abortions were reported for the 
comparison group. Thus, the Project Redirection group had more live 
births over the four-year postprogram follow-up period than the com 
parison group members.
Teenage Parent Demonstration Project (TPDP)
TPDP was evaluated by Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. (May- 
nard 1993). The TPDP was a large demonstration project operated at 
three sites—Camden and Newark in New Jersey, and Chicago, Illi 
nois—from late 1987 to mid-1991.
During this period, about 6,000 teenage mothers joined the welfare 
rolls, and about 90 percent of them were chosen to participate in the 
experiment. They were randomly assigned to be in the demonstration 
program or in a control group that only received regular AFDC pro 
gram services. Unlike Project Redirection, which paid participants a 
$30 a month bonus just for participating, TPDP had negative sanctions 
in the form of reduced AFDC payment if they refused to participate in 
the program altogether, or if they did not keep up with their assigned 
activities after enrolling (e.g., school attendance).
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The cornerstone of TPDP, like Project Redirection, was the provi 
sion of multiple services and the use of individual case management. 
As explained by the Mathematica evaluators:
Case managers helped participants decide what education or train 
ing to pursue, found open slots in appropriate programs, coaxed 
and pressured the young mothers to stick to their plans, and coun 
seled them when crises arose. If the teenage parents persistently 
failed to participate in planned activities, case managers initiated 
sanctions, consisting of reductions in AFDC grants by the amount 
normally allocated to cover the needs of the mother—generally 
$160 in New Jersey and $166 in Chicago—which remained effec 
tive until the young mothers complied with the participation 
requirements.
All three demonstration programs required participants to attend a 
set of initial workshops designed to enhance their personal skills, 
convey information that would help them cope with their new 
responsibilities, and prepare them for education, training, and 
employment activities. Workshop topics included, child support, 
family planning, health and nutrition, life skills, family manage 
ment, motivation, parenting, employment preparation, education 
preparation, and HIV and drug abuse prevention.
To help participants move toward self-sufficiency, the demonstra 
tion programs promoted participation in education, job training, 
and/or employment, relying heavily on existing community ser 
vices. However, they also developed some in-house services, 
using both their own staff and staff from other agencies. All three 
programs offered child care and transportation assistance to 
address these barriers to program participation (Maynard 1993, 
pp. 5 and 7).
The outcomes of TPDP that are available at this time refer to a 
period that averages 28 months after program intake for all partici 
pants. Participation in TPDP was open-ended—as long as the teenage 
mother remained on AFDC. One program outcome measured was the 
rate at which participants left AFDC. Table 4.8 compares the experi- 
mentals and controls on this outcome. The results are similar to what 
was observed in the GAIN and SWIM program evaluations—a definite 
lowering of participation, but by only a small amount.
Table 4.8 Outcomes of TPDP for Experimentals and Controls by Site of Project
Average number of pregnancies and 
Site___Percent participating in AFDC_____________live births per participant___________
Pregnancies Live births 
Experimentals Control Experimentals Control Experimentals Control
Camden
Newark
Chicago
78.1
84.4
75.5
79.8
85.5
79.2
0.9
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.9
1.0
0.6
0.4
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.7
SOURCE: Maynard 1993.
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Another important outcome measure is fertility behavior. The out 
come for TPDP was the same as for Project Redirection. Table 4.8 con 
tains the measures on this outcome for experimentals and controls. The 
results show both a slightly greater number of pregnancies and live 
births among experimentals than among controls.
LEAP and New Chance Programs
Some results from Ohio's Learning, Earning, and Parenting Pro 
gram have been presented in an interim MDRC follow-up evaluation 
(Bloom, Fellerath, Long, and Woods 1993). Preliminary results have 
been made available from a small and informal follow-up of 50 partici 
pants in the New Chance program (Quint, Fink, and Rowser 1993; 
Quint, Musick, and Ladner 1994). The results from these two prelimi 
nary examinations are not as reliable as MDRC's comprehensive 
experimental evaluations, but they are suggestive of what the compre 
hensive follow-up is likely to find.
Each of these programs is similar to one of the two programs for 
teen mothers described above. New Chance is very similar in spirit and 
approach to Project Redirection. Participation was voluntary in both 
programs (i.e., no sanctions were used either to compel initial partici 
pation or to continue participation), and positive reenforcement incen 
tives (e.g., better grades in high school led to accumulation of "stamps" 
that could be traded in for clothing, toys, movies, etc.) were used in 
both programs as part of a protective and caring environment for the 
young mothers. In addition, both programs stressed the role of a case 
manager as a caring adult advisor. Finally, both programs provided sig 
nificant services and treatments in addition to requirements for high 
school attendance.
Ohio's LEAP program is similar to the TPDP in that the program 
participation of young AFDC mothers was mandatory, and penalties 
were imposed for unsatisfactory participation. On the other hand, 
LEAP differed from TPDP in that the only major service component 
was an education program requiring that participants attend high 
school until a degree was obtained. Employment-related training or 
courses in health and personal development were not a part of LEAP.
LEAP used quite large monetary incentives, both positive and nega 
tive, to keep the young mothers attending school. Each LEAP partici-
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pant received a bonus of $62 for enrolling in school on time. For each 
subsequent month that she satisfied the program's attendance require 
ments, she received an additional $62 per month. The average teen 
mother in the AFDC program in 1990 received a regular monthly 
AFDC cash benefit of $274, so the monthly bonus of $62 represented 
an increase of 22 percent over the base level. In contrast, enrolling late 
for school resulted in a loss of $62, and unsatisfactory attendance in 
any month reduced the monthly welfare payment by $62. Thus, the 
total difference in monthly benefits between a teen mother who satis 
factorily attended school and one who did not was $124 (=$336-$212). 
This clearly represents a significant pecuniary incentive for teen moth 
ers in the program to satisfy the attendance requirements of LEAP. It is 
important to note that the attendance requirement in LEAP was not 
related to any measures of performance in school, such as maintaining 
a particular grade point average. Rather, it was a simple requirement of 
physical presence.
A short-run follow-up of early enrollees in LEAP shows that they 
had better attendance records in high school than the control group of 
teen mothers who did not receive either the LEAP bonus or penalty. 
This effect was also found in the evaluation of the TPDP program, in 
which experimentals attended school in more months than did control 
group members during the follow-up period. Recall that the TPDP also 
provided for very large pecuniary penalties for nonparticipation of 
experimentals.
MDRC followed and interviewed fifty girls (out of a total of 1,550 
girls who participated in New Chance during 1989-1992). They found 
thirty-six who had obtained the program's principal short-term objec 
tive, a GED certificate, by the time they left the program, while sixteen 
girls had left without obtaining the GED.4 On average, the fifty girls 
interviewed had been out of the New Chance program for about 30 
months at the time of the interview.
Of the thirty-four mothers who had obtained a GED in the New 
Chance program, the study found that twenty-nine (83 percent) had 
participated in some kind of postsecondary education and training 
since obtaining their GED, and twenty-two (65 percent) had worked 
for some time during their base period. However, at the time of the 
interview, twenty-five of these mothers (73 percent) were still receiv 
ing AFDC benefits. Further, among the sixteen mothers who had not
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obtained a GED, the study found that all of them were either still in the 
AFDC program or applying to reenter the program at the time of the 
interview. Finally, MDRC reports the unfortunately familiar and dis 
couraging finding with regard to subsequent pregnancy—of the thirty- 
four who obtained their GED, nineteen had become pregnant during 
the period since obtaining their GED and eleven of these pregnancies 
resulted in live births.5 The evaluations of the TPDP and Project Redi 
rection Programs both showed that, in spite of gains on some outcome 
measures, there were no significant differences between experimentals 
and controls on subsequent pregnancies and only a small reduction in 
the rate of AFDC participation.
Given the importance of young mothers in any welfare reform, it is 
important to develop alternative approaches for reducing their welfare 
dependence. Clearly, the best way for this population to escape welfare 
dependency is to avoid having an out-of-wedlock birth in the first 
place. Unfortunately little is known about how government can go 
about influencing the fertility behavior of young girls. There has been 
much discussion of sex education and condom distribution as ways of 
reducing out-of-wedlock birth. It is not at all clear, however, that igno 
rance about contraceptive devices is a principal cause of teenage child- 
bearing and subsequent welfare dependence.
Little empirical analysis is available about work and training pro 
grams that have served teenage girls from the inner-city before they 
had a child. However, a recent evaluation of the JOBSTART demon 
stration program (Case et al. 1993) provides evidence suggesting that if 
young disadvantaged girls can be reached before they have a baby, the 
probability that they will subsequently go on welfare may be signifi 
cantly reduced.
The JOBSTART demonstration, implemented between 1985 and 
1988, was not directly related to teen pregnancy or the AFDC program. 
Economically disadvantaged school dropouts age 17 to 21 with poor 
reading skills participated in education and vocational training and 
received support services and job placement assistance. Participation in 
JOBSTART was strictly voluntary, and the program was intended to 
increase the educational attainment and job prospects of the participat 
ing youth.
Although the impact of JOBSTART on earnings outcomes was dis 
appointing, the study did find that AFDC recipiency was significantly
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lower among the female experimentals who were not custodial mothers 
at the time they entered JOB START. For example, four years after 
entering the program, 39 percent of the noncustodial girls in the con 
trol group were in the AFDC program, while only 31 percent of the 
corresponding experimental group were. Thus, JOBSTART participa 
tion reduced welfare participation by almost 10 percentage points. 
Among girls who were already custodial mothers when they entered 
JOBSTART, there was no significant difference in AFDC participation 
rates between experimentals and controls two years after entry into the 
program (59.3 percent for experimentals vs. 60.5 percent for controls). 
The issue of prevention is clearly one that requires more attention than 
it has received thus far.
Workfare
Another approach to reducing welfare dependency, although widely 
referred to in the media, is probably the least well defined. To many 
analysts, the term "workfare" applies to any program for reducing wel 
fare dependency that is mandatory for AFDC recipients. Thus, the 
GAIN, SWIM, and PI programs described above, all of which were 
mandatory for certain subgroups of AFDC recipients, have sometimes 
been referred to as workfare programs. Indeed, the newly created fed 
eral-state JOBS program is often called in its entirety a workfare pro 
gram.
Nevertheless, the term workfare has also been applied to a specific 
kind of program in which welfare recipients were mandated to perform 
a particular job for a specified number of hours per week in return for 
welfare benefits. Formal training and education services have not usu 
ally been provided in these programs, and the skill demands of the 
work have usually been modest. Jobs have been located either in local 
government agencies or nonprofit organizations, and they could be per 
formed by the recipients with a minimum of informal on-the-job train 
ing.
One major objective of this approach—call it "pure" workfare—has 
been to reduce welfare dependency by reducing the real benefits of 
welfare; and this has been accomplished by" assigning a work require-
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ment to the receipt of welfare benefits. Thus, the work requirement was 
expected both to deter individuals from enrolling in AFDC, as well as 
to encourage earlier exits than otherwise would be likely to occur.
In addition, proponents of pure workfare argue that this approach 
has the potential for providing some valuable services to the commu 
nity as recipients work for their AFDC benefits. Some observers also 
have commented that the work experience itself could improve recipi 
ents' chances of obtaining a better job in either the private or public 
sector.6
What is the role in the current welfare situation for the pure work- 
fare approach? Is there empirical evidence on its effectiveness in 
reducing welfare dependence? And what subgroups of the welfare pop 
ulation can it most effectively serve?
Workfare has operated most directly and quickly on those welfare 
recipients who have fairly good earnings' prospects, including single 
adults covered by local and state welfare programs (ineligible for fed 
eral funding). For those recipients, the value of being on welfare drops 
sharply when they are mandated to participate in workfare. For recipi 
ent groups with low outside earnings prospects relative to benefit lev 
els, including teenage mothers, workfare has been much less likely to 
have an immediate effect on welfare participation. Although workfare 
has reduced the net benefit from being on AFDC, recipients would earn 
little if they went off welfare, so they have tended to remain. Neverthe 
less, it is possible that in the long run, teenage girls would be deterred 
by a workfare requirement from having an out-of-wedlock birth in the 
first place, and would be more motivated to stay in school and enhance 
their potential earnings.
Chart 4.1 illustrates the impact a workfare program would have on 
the real gain from welfare and how the situation would differ for high- 
wage and low-wage welfare recipients. That chart provides a standard 
economic utility analysis of the individual's choice between leisure 
time ("discretionary time" is perhaps a better term) and money income. 
The cash benefit amount is OM. Without a pure workfare program, the 
individual on welfare would receive this benefit without any loss of lei 
sure time, as indicated by Point 1. With a workfare program, the indi 
vidual could be at Point 2, where she would still receive the benefit of 
OM but would have to work PQ hours per week, losing that much in
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leisure time. Point 1 is clearly preferable to Point 2—that is, pure 
workfare has reduced the attractiveness of welfare.
But will the welfare recipient leave (or not come on) the program 
with pure workfare in effect? The answer depends in part on the recipi 
ent's potential earnings opportunities off welfare. Two leisure income 
trade-off lines are shown on the chart. That shown for Recipient A is 
steeper than that shown for Recipient B, indicating a higher potential 
wage rate for Recipient A. Recipient A has the option of taking the lei 
sure income bundle available on welfare with pure workfare (Point 2). 
But if she spends the hours required by workfare (PQ) at a private sec 
tor job, she can attain a higher money income than OM (Point 3). Thus, 
she would be likely to leave (or fail to come on) welfare when pure 
workfare is present.
Chart 4.1 Analysis of the Impact of Workfare on the Incentive 
to be on Welfare
Money income 
($)
M
Welfare 
benefit < 
amount
(with workfare) (without Leisure time 
workfare) (hours)
Recipient B, on the other hand, has an earnings capacity less than 
that of A. Her market earnings from the required PQ hours would put 
her at Point 4, less than the welfare grant of OM. Consequently, she
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would not be likely to leave welfare after pure workfare is put in place. 
A large fraction of welfare recipients are likely to resemble Recipient 
B.
Little empirical evidence is available concerning the magnitude of 
the effect of pure workfare on welfare participation. Research has been 
conducted on one large-scale application of something close to pure 
workfare conducted in Ohio in the 1980s, and some inferences about 
workfare can also be drawn from some mandatory educational and 
training programs.
The Ohio program was evaluated by Schiller and Brasher (1993), 
who report significant and large impacts of workfare on the AFDC 
caseload in Ohio. Schiller and Brasher compared AFDC caseloads in 
Ohio counties that implemented workfare with those that did not. As 
chart 4.2 shows, the divergence between n experimental and control 
counties is quite dramatic for the single-parent caseload. Schiller and 
Brasher applied multiple regression techniques to control for possible 
factors other than the workfare program that might differ between 
experimental and control counties. The sizable impact of workfare 
remained largely intact. The Schiller and Brasher study has been sub 
ject of a critical assessment that casts some doubt on the reliability of 
its findings. Although these criticisms weaken the reliability of the 
magnitude of the caseload-reducing effect of workfare, they do not 
appear to negate the finding that a positive and significant effect was 
present in the Ohio program.7
Some additional indirect empirical evidence on the effect of manda 
tory workfare on welfare caseloads can be obtained from the evalua 
tions of some of the education and training programs discussed above, 
as well as from some mandatory partial workfare programs that were 
tried in the early and mid-1980s under OBRA.
Three of the programs discussed above—GAIN, SWIM, and PI— 
were mandatory for any AFDC recipients who were assigned to them. 
Thus, for recipients who either had a good job prospect or were work 
ing "off-the-books," a mandate to participate in a program like GAIN 
may have been similar to a mandate to participate in a pure workfare 
program.8 One would either lose leisure time or no longer be able to 
work at an unreported outside job and at the same time collect welfare 
benefits.
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Chart 4.2 Impact Analysis of Ohio©s Workplace Program AFDC (Single 
Parent) Caseload Trends
% Change in AFDC-U Caseload from 1981:1
120
1234123412341234123412341234 
1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987
Time
-••60 non-CWEP counties +20 applicant counties 3ta pilot CWEP counties
SOURCE: Schiller and Brasher 1993, figure 2.
Table 4.9 shows, for those participants in the three recent programs 
surveyed and two OBRA workfare programs who were assigned to the 
experimental group, the percent who left the program without receiv 
ing any of the services (or performing any of the workfare assignment)
Table 4.9 Percentage of Experimental Group Who Obtained No Services 
from Their Program
Program Percent
GAIN
SWIM
Project Independence
San Diego WEP
Cook County WEP
46
31
57
54
52
provided by the program. In each program (except perhaps for SWIM), 
large percentages of AFDC recipients who were assigned to the experi-
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mental group (i.e. those who must show up for program activities) left 
the program without participating at all. Why would such large propor 
tions leave a mandated program assignment for which they would be 
sanctioned with reduced benefits? The researchers conducting the eval 
uation studies made some effort to find out what had happened to these 
recipients.
The authors of the GAIN study (Friedlander, Riccio, and Freedman 
1993) report as follows:
While a substantial portion of the orientation attenders—ranging 
from 37 to 57 percent—did not participate in a GAIN activity, 
almost all of the nonparticipants were people who were not 
required to participate in GAIN activities by the end of the follow- 
up period. The vast majority (80 to 100 percent) of the nonpartici 
pants were either no longer enrolled in the program (i.e., they 
were "deregistered") because they had gotten a full-time job, left 
welfare, were sanctioned or met other specific criteria, or were 
temporarily excused from participating because of part-time 
employment, illness, or other reasons (i.e., they were officially 
"deferred") (p. 221).
In the PI study (Kemple and Haimson 1994), it is reported that:
It is not clear how many of those who did not attend orientation 
left the program because they found a job or because they left the 
AFDC rolls. In all, However, 70 percent of those who did not 
attend orientation were employed at some point during the follow- 
up period, and 66 percent were employed during either the quarter 
in which they were randomly assigned or the following quarter (p. 
60).
If is clear that large numbers of those who immediately left the man 
dated assignment also left AFDC, the hypothesized effect of workfare 
on the welfare caseload. However, as the researchers all pointed out, it 
is not possible to know how much of the exit from AFDC was caused 
by the mandated assignment and how much reflects ongoing caseload 
turnover unrelated to the mandated assignment.
In sum, workfare, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, may be 
capable of reducing welfare caseloads. However, the empirical evi 
dence is scanty and much further research is needed. The recently 
passed welfare reform bill requires, in effect, a form of workfare for all 
participants who reach their two-year limits and can no longer receive
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welfare benefits without spending some time in a work activity (see 
chapter 1). Should workfare be applied at an earlier point? Mothers 
whose children are already in school and who are likely to have rela 
tively good job prospects could be a target group for mandatory work- 
fare. Whether or not workfare should be applied to recipients with pre 
school-aged children before they reach their two-year limit or even at 
the two-year limit is a more complex question since it involves the 
potentially large costs of childcare.
Summary
As noted at the beginning of the chapter we feel that our survey indi 
cates that even the most recently conceived education and training pro 
grams, and especially those targeted at young teenage mothers, have 
simply not been effective in raising their earnings capacity, reducing 
fertility, or reducing the welfare caseload. However, it is possible that 
combined with a strictly enforced time limit, the education and training 
programs might have a significant positive effect in reducing welfare 
caseloads. State welfare administrators should be encouraged to pursue 
follow-up evaluations of education and training programs operated 
with the time limit in place.
The general workfare approach (including initiatives that are imbed 
ded in mandatory education and training programs) may be capable of 
some significant reductions in the welfare caseload, but the empirical 
evidence is still somewhat thin.
The results for the special programs aimed at teenage AFDC moth 
ers were particularly discouraging and suggest that the emphasis of 
policy should shift toward the objective of reducing teenage pregnan 
cies.
NOTES
1. Similar findings were reached in evaluations of the traditional WIN programs which pre 
ceded the OBRA demonstration projects using statistical evaluation methodologies (Ketron Inc. 
1980; Grossman, Maynard, and Roberts 1985).
2. Carol Romero (1994, Appendix A) comes to a similar conclusion about MDRC methodol 
ogy.
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3. In 1993, the GAO found that about 24 percent of teenage mothers on AFDC in 1992 had 
been served by JOBS, which started in most states in 1990 (GAO 1993).
4. This was not a random sample. Program data show that for all 1,550 New Chance partici 
pants, about 24 percent had obtained a GED by the time they left the program.
5. MDRC has released some interim findings on New Chance based on their usual experimen 
tal/control group methodology. It reports on girls who had enrolled in the program 18 months 
before. Their findings are similar to what was reported in the informal follow-up study—no differ 
ence in subsequent fertility behavior or welfare participation between experimentals and controls 
("New Chance: Interim Findings" Confidential Release, MDRC, June 9, 1994).
6. Based on discussions with Kathy Zall, former director of Employment and Training Pro 
grams, Human Resources Administration, New York City. Also Betsy Gotbaum, former commis 
sioner, New York City Parks and Recreation, reported successfully recruiting good employees for 
regular jobs in her agency from among welfare recipients who had been assigned to the Parks 
Department under a workfare program mandated by the city for its Home Relief recipients. 
(Home Relief is a state and locally funded welfare program for single individuals.)
7. The critical assessment alluded to was written by Ralph Smith of the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO), who reviewed the Schiller-Brasher study when it first appeared in 1988 (internal 
memo—copy available on request). Smith's criticism notes that there were only eight experimen 
tal counties (vs. 80 nonexperimental counties) and the experimentals may have been subject to 
special factors not controlled for in the multiple regression analysis. For example, these eight 
counties may have been trending down in terms of their AFDC caseloads before the experiment 
began.
8. It is not identical because there is the opportunity of joining an education or training pro 
gram (some areas offer college education opportunities). If the participant puts some value on 
these opportunities, she may not leave

CHAPTER
Administrative and Incentive Changes 
Under the Jobs Program
What Did They Do for Welfare Reform?
In 1988 the JOBS program had been hailed as an approach that 
would reduce welfare dependency both by providing the education and 
training services described above and by changing the way welfare 
programs were administered. Under JOBS, the AFDC program was to 
have become a vehicle for developing the work motivation and skills of 
clients, rather than a system for determining eligibility and dispensing 
checks. Moreover, states were encouraged to experiment with changes 
in the rules and incentives of their AFDC programs to see if they could 
reduce welfare dependency. Under the new welfare legislation, states 
will have the freedom to continue the experiments started under JOBS 
as well as to develop additional changes in rules and incentives.
Did the JOBS framework actually provide these kinds of changes in 
the administration of the AFDC program? Has the state waiver pro 
gram led to experiments that have resulted, or are likely to result, in a 
reduced welfare caseload? We examine some evidence on each of these 
questions. 1
Administrative Objectives Under JOBS
Here we examine two kinds of indirect evidence: types of services 
provided and recipients served, and overall coverage and utilization of 
JOBS services by the AFDC population.
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Types of Services Provided and Recipients Served
Table 5.1 shows that in FY91 most of the participants in the JOBS 
program were in a formal education program (elementary, secondary 
or postsecondary) or in a formal training program. There was little use 
of any program element resembling workfare, such as Community 
Work Experiences Programs (CWEP). This is no surprise because the 
1988 legislation that established JOBS stipulated that formal education 
and training activities should be the main focus. Only four states—Col 
orado, Nevada, Ohio and West Virginia—have placed a significant 
fraction of their JOBS resources into CWEP. This emphasis on formal 
education and training constituted a sharp break from the OBRA-WIN 
program approach that immediately preceded JOBS. Under OBRA- 
WIN, a greater emphasis was placed on CWEP-type activities.
Table 5.1 Average Monthly Percentage of JOBS Participants Distributed 
by Service Component, Fiscal Year 1992: U.S. Total
____Types of JOBS service_______Percent of total enrolled___
Education
High school 29.3 
Post secondary 17.8 
Vocational training 7.5 
Jobs skill training 11.4 
Jobs readiness 5.4 
Job development and entry 10.3 
Job search 11.3 
On-the-job training 0.5 
Work supplementation 0.1 
CWEP 4.4 
Other 1.9 
Total* 100.0 
Total number of participants3_____________403,653________
SOURCE: Derived from table 10-6, 1994 Green Book, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee
on Ways and Means.
a. The total excludes those who are listed as in "assessment/employment plan." Each component
is shown as a percentage of this adjusted total. Percentages may not add to 100 percent due to
rounding.
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The JOBS legislation also targets specific subgroups of AFDC 
recipients—the long-term AFDC recipient and, especially, the teen-age 
mother who has not received a high school diploma. Yet a recent GAO 
survey (GAO 1993) estimated that only about 24 percent of all AFDC 
parents under 20 years of age were being served by JOBS. These 
young mothers were almost exclusively enrolled in secondary school 
in either a regular degree program or a GED program. Of the teen 
mothers served by JOBS, about 25 percent were also receiving some 
type of special support service for teen mothers such as "life-skills" 
training or prenatal classes. For these few AFDC teen mothers, the 
treatment under JOBS was similar to the treatment received under 
Project Redirection and the Teen Parent Demonstration Project, 
reviewed earlier.
The remaining JOBS participants were drawn from other targeted 
groups, such as mothers whose youngest child is within two years of 
age 18, and from nontargeted groups who are generally short-term 
AFDC recipients.
Overall Coverage and Utilization of JOBS by States
The 1988 JOBS legislation required that certain percentages of non- 
exempt AFDC recipients participate in JOBS activities if the state was 
to continue receiving federal matching funds for JOBS. This require 
ment generated a management information system under which the 
states reported each year on the percentage of all AFDC recipients who 
are nonexempt (i.e., are "mandatory" for participation in JOBS) and 
the percent of these mandatory participants who did in fact participate. 
Did JOBS lead to large percentages of AFDC mothers being made 
mandatory and required to participate in training and other programs? 
And has JOBS been more effective than previous work and training 
regimes in inducing participation?
The 1988 law, as well as other programs that preceded JOBS 
(OBRA-WIN), allowed for exemptions from participation in work- 
education-training programs. The most important reason for exemption 
has always been the presence of pre-school-age children, either under 
age 6 (pre-JOBS) or under age 3 (JOBS). JOBS is more complicated 
than pre-JOBS programs with regard to the young child exemption, 
however. Under JOBS, a child between ages 3 and 6 can trigger an
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exemption if childcare services are not guaranteed to the mother. On 
the other hand, an AFDC mother who is younger than 20 years of age, 
is not enrolled in school and does not have a high school diploma must 
participate in JOBS, regardless of the age of her child. Further, JOBS 
allows states to reduce the minimum age at which a child qualifies a 
mother for exemption to 1 year old.
Table 5.2 shows the percentage of AFDC adult recipients who are 
nonexempt from JOBS, ("mandatories"), the percentage of these 
AFDC mandatories who were participants in JOBS, and the percent of 
JOBS participants among all AFDC adult recipients for FY 91, FY 92, 
and FY 94, by state and for the entire U.S.
On average, across states, 43 percent of the AFDC adult recipients 
are found to be mandatories for JOBS—meaning that slightly less than 
60 percent of AFDC adult recipients were exempt from the program. A 
60 percent exemption rate is larger than the fraction of AFDC recipient 
children who are under 3 years of age (about 25 percent across states) 
and even larger than the fraction of children under age 6 (about 40 per 
cent). As table 5.3 shows, about 73 percent of all exemptions arise 
because of the presence of children below the age cut-off. Thus, almost 
all preschool children on AFDC must have been providing exemptions 
for their mothers—with other factors, such as having a sick child, pro 
viding the remainder of exemptions. Since JOBS does not require 
mothers to participate when childcare is lacking, this finding may 
reflect limitations on childcare resources, although it might also reflect 
a lack of enthusiasm by welfare administrators for enforcing the JOBS 
participation obligation.
The large variation across states in these percentages probably 
reflects these same factors—variation in the percent of children under 3 
and 6, availability of child care resources, and variable enforcement by 
welfare administrators.
A comparison of columns 8 and 9 in table 5.2 shows that, although 
22 percent of the JOBS mandatories were participating in JOBS activi 
ties (in FY 94), these participants account for only 9 percent of all 
AFDC recipients. Thus, to increase the overall JOBS participation rate 
(the percent of all welfare recipients in JOBS) to a level of 60 or 70 
percent would require a very large increase in resources over current 
levels—with a large amount needed for child care services
Table 5.2 Percent of AFDC Caseload Mandatory for JOBS, Percent Mandatories Participating in JOBS, and 
Percent Caseload Participating in JOBS, FY 1991,1992,1994
State
U.S. (total)
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
(1)
% of AFDC
adults
mandatory 
for JOBS
39
17
27
21
38
36
69
52
31
37
24
32
6
20
54
18
(2)
FY 1991
%of
mandatories
participating 
in JOBS
15
26
16
12
24
14
14
27
28
9
19
10
9
27
11
7
(3)
% of AFDC
adults
participating 
in JOBS
6
4
4
3
9
5
10
14
9
3
5
3
1
5
6
1
(4)
% of AFDC
adults
mandatory 
for JOBS
43
26
22
25
37
39
70
61
41
51
26
39
7
21
57
39
(5)
FY 1992
%of
mandatories
participating 
in JOBS
17
30
18
11
24
12
17
24
18
12
15
12
10
39
11
6
(6)
% of AFDC
adults
participating 
in JOBS
7
8
4
3
9
5
12
15
7
6
4
5
1
8
6
2
(7)
% of AFDC
adults
mandatory 
for JOBS
43
25
27
19
23
42
71
56
39
48
19
42
37
25
55
40
(8)
FY 1994
%of
mandatories
participating 
in JOBS
22
62
23
17
20
19
15
21
19
10
31
22
15
39
20
23
(9)
% of AFDC
adults
participating 
in JOBS
9
15
6
3
5
8
11
12
7
5
6
9
5
10
11
9
Table 5.2 (continued)
State
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
(1)
%ofAFDC
adults
mandatory 
for JOBS
32
54
18
24
49
50
43
57
46
12
24
58
38
21
34
52
35
(2)
FY 1991
%of
mandatories
participating 
in JOBS
10
6
23
9
7
6
39
12
8
3
8
25
73
16
23
14
18
(3)
% of AFDC
adults
participating 
in JOBS
3
3
4
2
3
3
17
7
4
0.4
2
15
28
3
8
7
6
(4)
% of AFDC
adults
mandatory 
for JOBS
32
56
24
33
55
50
50
56
29
20
29
90
41
28
40
56
28
(5)
FY 1992
%of
mandatories
participating 
in JOBS
12
20
20
13
9
10
32
17
16
13
14
17
77
15
25
14
26
(6)
% of AFDC
adults
participating 
in JOBS
4
11
5
4
5
5
16
10
5
3
4
15
32
4
10
8
7
(7)
% of AFDC
adults
mandatory 
for JOBS
39
59
59
40
55
40
50
64
35
48
38
52
45
37
41
61
33
(8)
FY 1994
%of
mandatories
participating 
in JOBS
16
36
20
23
23
18
17
21
19
18
17
28
76
17
41
18
28
(9)
% of AFDC
adults
participating 
in JOBS
6
21
12
9
13
7
9
13
7
9
6
14
34
6
17
11
9
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
43
28
38
52
68
39
45
56
23
29
16
41
67
55
29
27
60
52
33
10
9
26
15
45
20
10
17
20
25
11
12
43
11
16
16
13
39
44
4
3
10
8
31
8
5
10
5
7
2
5
29
6
5
4
8
20
15
45
38
37
54
70
48
46
63
35
34
20
46
84
51
36
36
52
53
34
14
14
31
19
32
21
13
14
16
25
20
12
35
14
18
31
13
32
31
6
5
11
10
22
10
6
9
6
9
4
6
29
7
6
11
7
17
11
46
41
36
16
44
57
49
70
26
50
22
33
69
50
38
36
48
41
52
19
20
29
29
9
30
19
16
29
57
24
17
51
15
19
37
28
32
52
9
8
10
13
4
17
9
11
7
29
5
6
35
7
7
13
13
13
27
SOURCE: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Green Book: FY 1991, 1993 edition (table 7, pp. 642-644), FY 1992, 19 
edition (table 10-8, pp. 357-359, FY 1994, 1996 edition (table 8-9, pp. 425-427).
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Table 5.3 AFDC Adult Recipients Exempt from Work Programs by 
Reason for Exemption
Percent distribution
Total
exempt Aged, poor Child 
Year___adults health underage Student Employed Other
1987 1,980,604 8.4 72.5 0.5 1.9 16.7 
1991 2,327,525 8.7____72.8_____1.4_____2.9_____14.2
SOURCE: Characteristics and Financial Circumstances of AFDC Recipients, FY 1991 and FY 
1987, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Family Assistance, Washington, 
DC.
Table 5.4 compares the percentage of AFDC recipients who were 
mandatory registrants for work and training programs in FY 1986, 
1987, and 1992. During 1986 and 1987, the OBRA-WIN program was 
in force, and in 1992 JOBS was in operation. As noted, under OBRA- 
WIN any child under age 6 would trigger an exemption, while under 
JOBS the exemption age could be 3 if childcare were available and 
could be eliminated entirely if the schooling attained by the AFDC 
teenage mother were less than a high school degree. In general, since 
the exemption requirements are more stringent under JOBS, we would 
expect to find a larger percent subject to the mandate under JOBS than 
under OBRA-WIN.
The data in table 5.4 show that this is not the case. The mandatory 
percentages are about the same under the two regimes. And table 5.3 
shows that the reasons for being nonmandatory (exempt from work- 
training programs) were very similar under JOBS and OBRA-WIN. 
Clearly, the presence of a young, and especially a pre-school-age, child 
has always been a very important barrier to participation in education 
and training programs. Moreover, the data in table 5.4 suggest that this 
problem may be as strong as ever in spite of the pressures to promote 
employability activities surrounding the JOBS program. However, the 
small increase in the percent participating in JOBS activities in FY 94 
suggests some improvement may have been made under JOBS. Again, 
we cannot be sure if the low mandatory participation rates reflect lack 
of child care resources or a resistant attitude by administrators.
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Table 5.4 Percent of Adult AFDC Recipients who were Mandatory
Registrants for Work and Training Programs, by State, Fiscal 
Years 1986,1987,1992
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
FY 1986
23
18
22
41
30
29
36
30
27
23
26
17
30
32
39
24
24
24
15
23
31
43
91
23
10
16
27
FY 1987
19
16
23
55
30
28
36
29
29
71
25
14
30
32
53
26
23
60
8
26
27
47
91
26
5
15
28
FY 1992
26
22
25
37
39
70
61
41
51
26
39
7
21
57
39
32
56
24
33
55
50
50
56
29
20
29
90
(continued)
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Table 5.4 (continued)
State
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
- South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
U.S. Total
FY 1986
97
18
27
41
17
32
38
42
32
92
40
97
33
22
35
46
30
21
21
36
27
37
28
39
39
FY 1987
97
20
25
41
19
30
37
41
30
93
35
96
36
18
34
51
39
19
44
32
28
40
31
35
40
FY 1992
41
28
40
56
28
45
38
37
54
70
48
46
63
35
34
20
46
84
51
36
36
52
53
34
43
SOURCE: Columns (1) and (2) are from Characteristics and Financial Circumstances ofAFDC 
Recipients, FY86 and FY87, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Family 
Assistance. Column (3) is from 1994 Green Book, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on 
Ways and Means.
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Finally, table 5.5 shows the percentage of female AFDC participants 
who were employed (either full time or part time) at the end of the fis 
cal years 1987 and 1991. 2 Again, there is little sign that the impact of 
JOBS on the employ ability and work incentives of AFDC recipients is 
any greater than that of earlier programs with similar goals. However, 
because economic conditions were less favorable in 1991 than in 1987, 
it is possible that JOBS has improved utilization of training-employ 
ment activities.
Program Experiments by States under the JOBS Waiver Program
Like the OBRA-WIN program before it, the JOBS program has 
allowed individual states to make experimental modifications and 
changes in their individual state AFDC programs. Some states 
appeared quite eager to experiment with program changes in order to 
improve their overall AFDC programs. By early 1996, 44 states were 
involved in special experimental changes that required waivers from 
the federal government. 3
Our review is in two parts. The first part covers two types of experi 
ments that, although aimed at getting people to leave welfare, may 
have the unintended effect of providing people with incentives to join 
the rolls. The experiments in the second group do not have this type of 
side effect.
Experiments with Marginal Work Incentives and with the 
AFDC- UP Program
Thirty of the forty-four states operating under program waivers have 
been experimenting with some form of marginal work incentive provi 
sion that is more generous than the provisions contained in the federal 
rules.4 In addition, thirty-three states have been experimenting with 
eliminating the work experience rule for the eligibility of a two-parent 
family for the AFDC-UP part of the AFDC program.
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Table 5.5 Percent of Female AFDC Recipients Who Were Employed 
(either Part Time or Full Time), Pre-JOBS (1987) and Post- 
JOBS (1991), by State of Residence
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
June 1987
4.2
6.3
4.9
5.6
5.3
8.2
6.7
5.8
4.8
7.5
2.5
5.9
7.0
2.9
10.3
15.8
10.2
3.7
0.7
7.9
3.3
7.4
9.3
14.4
4.1
6.5
12.3
June 1991
3.0
10.7
5.1
5.5
6.3
6.0
5.3
8.7
1.8
6.1
5.5
13.8
13.9
4.0
8.5
15.8
12.6
11.1
2.6
15.2
3.7
4.5
11.7
11.4
12.1
6.2
12.1
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State
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Guam
Puerto Rico
Virgin Islands
U.S. Total
June 1987
15.9
4.7
9.5
2.9
5.2
4.0
3.9
17.6
3.7
6.7
14.0
3.6
8.3
8.2
15.6
6.7
3.2
20.4
11.3
7.6
7.9
4.7
15.9
7.4
0.6
0.3
2.5
5.8
June 1991
15.6
2.5
5.5
2.5
7.2
2.9
13.0
16.0
5.2
5.8
10.0
2.8
3.9
11.2
12.4
9.2
4.1
20.0
8.9
4.8
8.4
1.9
16.1
26.1
2.1
0.1
3.0
6.4
SOURCE: Characteristics and Financial Circumstances ofAFDC Recipients, FY 1991 and FY 
1987, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Family Assistance, Washington, 
D.C.
98 Administrative and Incentive Changes Under the Jobs Program
Marginal Work Incentives
In 1995, except for $190 a month that could be deducted for work 
and childcare expenses and $30 a month that was "disregarded," a 
working AFDC mother's earnings were all subtracted from her AFDC 
benefit amount. Moreover, the $30 monthly income disregard was only 
allowed during the mother's first year on the program. The AFDC 
amount was then reduced by all of the recipient's remaining net earn 
ings—sometimes called a "100 percent implicit tax on net earnings."
The various experimental disregard programs all increased the 
amount of net earnings that could be disregarded. For example, in Cal 
ifornia, the first $30 plus 33 percent of the remaining net earnings have 
been disregarded, with no time limit on the disregard. In Michigan, the 
disregard has been $200 a month plus 20 percent of the remaining net 
earnings.
These disregards were aimed at providing existing welfare recipi 
ents with a monetary incentive to work—that is, the recipients could 
add to their total income by working because their net earnings would 
not be fully deducted from their AFDC benefit amount. On the other 
hand, even though these disregards may have increased work effort 
among AFDC recipients, there is no empirical evidence over the his 
tory of their use (1967-1981) and nonuse (1982-present) to suggest that 
they also got recipients to leave the program entirely. This is not really 
surprising, given the fact that earnings disregards by themselves do not 
give a recipient a pecuniary incentive to leave the program. However, 
the earnings disregards do provide an incentive to work while on wel 
fare and to combine some level of earnings with some reduced benefit 
amount.
The way these effects are expected to operate is illustrated in chart 
5.1. Note that the disregard expands the recipient's potential income 
for a given number of hours worked while on welfare. Supporters of 
earnings disregards argue that recipients will be prompted to leave the 
welfare program as their earnings in the private sector grow due to 
increased work experience. They claim that the disregard operates by 
first inducing the recipient to try working while still receiving welfare 
benefits, and then motivating the recipient to get on-the-job training to 
raise her earnings capacity to a level that makes leaving welfare attrac 
tive financially. This process can move a recipient off the program, but
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only if the slope of her off-program budget line, which equals her wage 
rate, as shown in chart 5.1, does in fact pivot (at point L0) to the right 
by a significant amount.
Chart 5.1 Analysis of the Effect of Earnings Disregards on the Incentive 
to Come On and to Leave Welfare
Money income 
($)
M
Welfare 
benefit < 
amount
Leisure time
NOTE: Without an earnings disregard the individual©s budget line is LoTVX. With an 
earnings disregard the budget line becomes L^TZX.
What proponents of disregards have usually overlooked is that in 
addition to stimulating work among women on welfare—a good 
effect—they can also provide a pecuniary incentive for women not on 
welfare to come into the program. This can also be illustrated in chart 
5.1. In the absence of a disregard, the budget line confronting a poten 
tial welfare program entrant (L0TVX) is such that she would not come 
on the program because she is on her budget line between points V and 
X. Her earnings rate in the private sector and her preferences between 
money income and leisure are such that the welfare benefit amount
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itself (L0T) is not enough for her to go into the program. However, 
when a positive disregard rate is introduced to the picture, her budget 
line on welfare pivots up to (L0TZX) and she might now enter the pro 
gram and reduce her hours of work—locating somewhere on the seg 
ment TZ. Now the combination of reduced earnings and partial welfare 
benefits is more attractive than her income off welfare.
There is some empirical evidence on the caseload-increasing effects 
of earnings disregards. 5 For example, we saw previously that the Fam 
ily Independence Plan (FIP) program contained a generous earnings 
disregard for AFDC women in the treatment group and that the evalua 
tion of FIP reported caseload increases. It is not clear how earnings dis 
regards would interact with strict time limits under the new welfare 
legislature. The strict time limit gives recipients the incentive to 
become job-ready, and whether they need the extra incentives of the 
disregard is not obvious. As noted for training programs, state welfare 
administrators should carefully monitor the possible caseload effects of 
marginal disregard increases.
AFDC- UP Program
The AFDC-UP Program was an optional program for states up to 
1990. After that, it was mandatory for every state to provide a program 
for families with dependent children in which both parents were 
present but neither can locate a job. The federal rules limited participa 
tion in AFDC-UP to those families in which at least one of the parents 
had significant work experience in the four years preceding application 
for AFDC-UP. More specifically, parents had to have worked in six 
quarters out of the twelve quarters that preceded their time of applica 
tion for AFDC-UP. This work-experience requirement is similar to that 
used by the unemployment insurance (UI) program. In addition the 
AFDC-UP program required that a spouse who goes back to work does 
not work more than 100 hours a month. Working more than 100 hours, 
even if earnings are still low enough for eligibility, would lead to loss 
of eligibility.
The reason for the work-experience requirement was to restrict the 
benefits of the program to those who have demonstrated a serious 
attachment to the labor force. The requirement excluded unemployed 
families who had just entered the labor force until they had demon 
strated the requisite attachment by accumulating work experience.
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States that have experimented with dropping the work-experience 
requirement for their AFDC-UP program were hoping that it would 
keep young couples together who otherwise would split up in order to 
obtain AFDC benefits. A young couple with a dependent child but no 
job or work experience could come into the AFDC-UP program as an 
intact family in those states with this experiment in place (Alabama, 
Florida, Michigan, Illinois, and Vermont).
A potential problem with this approach was similar to that suggested 
for the earnings disregard—that is, some young, unemployed married 
couples who would not have divorced or separated to go on welfare 
would have an incentive to participate in the AFDC-UP program. 
Young couples with limited skills and little work experience generally 
start out with low-paying jobs and may have a hard time finding and 
deciding among job options. With the work-experience requirement 
waived, some of them may have been tempted to delay this stressful 
process by taking advantage of AFDC-UP. The situation is similar for 
the 100-hour rule. Its purpose was to discourage couples from using 
AFDC benefits to finance their marriage by sharply limiting the 
amount of income they could obtain while collecting AFDC-UP bene 
fits. Again, some married couples who would not have split up to col 
lect AFDC benefits with the 100-hour rule would have been tempted to 
go on AFDC when it was lifted in the experiment.
Other Experiments
Most of the remaining state experiments under the JOBS waiver 
program fall into three groups: time-limit experiments, experiments 
that limited the additional benefits that could be obtained when a 
child is born after the family was on the program, and various rules 
and sanctions relating to participation in the JOBS education and 
training program activities. There are other types of experiments with 
childcare provisions, responsibilities of grandparents and step-par 
ents, and initiatives related to children and teen parents, which we do 
not comment on.
Two-Year Limits
Thirteen states, including Florida, Iowa, Vermont, and Wisconsin, 
have set up experiments under which some recipients in some locations
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in the state were told that they can only collect benefits for a specific 
and limited period of time.
Florida's experiment was conducted in only two counties in the 
state. The plan limited recipients to no more than 24 months of AFDC 
benefits in any 60-month period or more than 36 months of benefits in 
any 72-month period. The particular time-limit group a recipient was 
assigned to depended on family characteristics. The plan allowed fami 
lies who lost AFDC benefits under the experiment to keep their Medic- 
aid eligibility. Moreover, there was no provision requiring a specified 
minimum time to elapse between the exhaustion of benefit payments 
and renewed welfare eligibility. Thus, immediately after 60 months or 
72 months, the family would be eligible for 24 or 36 more weeks of 
benefits.
Iowa's plan, which was put in force statewide, did not mention a 
specific time limit. The plan simply states that "once JOBS participants 
have reached the end of a mutually agreed upon time frame for achiev 
ing self-sufficiency, benefits are terminated (with a possible extension 
for good cause)."
Vermont's time-limit experiment, also enforced statewide since July 
1994, required that after 30 months of AFDC, a family head must 
obtain his/her own job or participate in subsidized community service 
employment.
Wisconsin's experiment operated in two counties and was similar to 
Florida's—i.e., benefits could be collected for up to 24 months within a 
48-month period. However, unlike Florida, Wisconsin required a mini 
mum time period of 36 months to elapse between the collection of the 
last AFDC monthly payment and the receipt of additional AFDC bene 
fits. On the other hand, both the Florida and Wisconsin time-limit 
experiments allowed recipients to return to welfare after some prede 
termined period had elapsed.
Additional Children and Benefits
Twenty states have had some form of limit on how much benefits 
would increase when an AFDC family had an additional child that was 
conceived while the parents were on welfare. Georgia, New Jersey, and 
Wisconsin, for example, have had experimental programs that limit the 
amount of cash AFDC benefits a family could obtain when the family
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has another child while already on the program. The food stamp allot 
ment did increase for the additional child, however.
Both Georgia and New Jersey allowed no increase in the AFDC cash 
benefit for an additional child, and both states were explicit in saying 
that what made the family ineligible for a benefit increase was the con 
ception of the additional child after the family had gone on AFDC. 
Wisconsin allowed the family one-half of the usual per child cash 
allowance for the "second child born" and nothing for the third and 
additional children born. Wisconsin's program statement did not men 
tion whether time of conception or birth governed this determination.
Utilization of JOBS Services
States have experimented with ways to increase the utilization of 
their JOBS program's educational and training services. One approach 
has been to extend permission for use of the services to the noncusto 
dial parent of an AFDC child— usually the father. Another has been to 
specify that only mothers with very young children (e.g., less than six 
months) can be excused from participating in JOBS activities.
Some states also require AFDC children age 14 or older to partici 
pate in JOBS, and some states reserve the right to cut off benefits if 
recipients, who are mandatory for JOBS, fail to participate.
Summary
Our review suggests that the JOBS legislative-administrative appa 
ratus made, at best, only marginal improvement over past regimes in 
utilizing work and training programs to reduce the welfare caseload. 
The AFDC program has been, for all practical purposes, dominated 
administratively by the individual state welfare administrators. Thus it 
remains to be seen whether the efforts of the federal government to 
mandate participation under the new welfare program will produce any 
results unless the states really believe that education and training will 
greatly reduce welfare caseloads.
The wide range of experiments launched by the states under the 
JOBS waiver provisions, however, is a very hopeful sign. It suggests 
that giving more discretion to the states might lead to innovative
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approaches to the problem of reducing welfare caseloads and easing 
the transition to work. However, as noted, it is too early to assess the 
results of the experiments started in the early 1990s. Since this was a 
period that included a recession and then a full-scale recovery, it will 
be difficult to separate out the effects of the waiver experiments on the 
AFDC caseload from the effects of the changes in the economy.
NOTES
1. The study by Greenberg and Wiseman (1992) presents an interesting analysis of how the 
OBRA administrative framework influenced the JOBS program.
2. These figures refer to work activities that are reported to the program. There is some evi 
dence that AFDC recipients underreported their earnings.
3. Periodic summaries of state waivers are prepared by the American Public Welfare Associa 
tion and by the Center for Law and Social Policy (CLASP).
4. The amount of coverage of any waiver program within a state varies from total coverage to 
coverages of only a small part of the state's AFDC program.
5. See chapters 2 and 4.
CHAPTER
Summary and Concluding Comments
In recent years there has been growing concern that the AFDC pro 
gram has fostered welfare dependency and encouraged the formation 
of female-headed families. Such concerns have spurred widespread 
support for legislation that would significantly restrict eligibility for 
benefits and in other ways reduce the attractiveness of the program. 
The new law that replaces AFDC makes many such changes, including 
the imposition of a five-year lifetime limit on receipt of welfare and 
stiffer work requirements during periods of welfare receipt. Signifi 
cantly, the law also gives the states substantially more power to deter 
mine eligibility, benefit structure, and program provisions than was the 
case under AFDC.
This study presented data and analysis bearing on three key aspects 
of welfare participation that the states will have to consider as they 
determine the best way to implement the new welfare legislation. One 
is the effect of financial incentives in the welfare benefit system on 
welfare participation. The second involves the patterns of welfare use 
and the work skills and other characteristics of short- and long-term 
welfare recipients. The third is the effectiveness of the many work and 
training programs for welfare participants that have been tried over the 
past twenty-five years.
The Effect of Financial Incentives
The new law will reduce the value of going on welfare in several 
ways. The imposition of a five-year time limit significantly reduces the 
potential benefit that could be accumulated over a life time. A manda 
tory work requirement after two years in the program imposes costs on
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recipients who will lose free time. Block grants could lead states to 
provide lower benefits than would otherwise be the case.
An important question then is how individuals will respond to the 
reduced income stream offered by welfare. Will the changed incentives 
induce current recipients to leave welfare, through work or marriage, 
sooner than was the case in the old AFDC program? Will the new pro 
visions discourage entry into welfare in the first place and reverse the 
trend of increasing formation of female-headed families, particularly 
through out-of-wedlock childbearing? Or will the primary effect of 
these changes be to increase poverty with little or no change in the 
work or marital behavior of recipients forced to leave the program, or 
in the motivation of young women to take steps to avoid welfare 
dependency?
Research cannot give definitive answers to these questions. How 
ever, the analysis in chapter 2 suggests that individuals are responsive 
to changes in the level of benefits provided by the welfare system. The 
growth in the welfare caseload since the mid 1960s is consistent with 
the growth in the value of the total benefit package (including the 
AFDC cash benefit plus Food Stamps and Medicaid) which was 60 
percent higher in 1994, after adjusting for inflation, than the value of 
benefits in 1964 when benefits were largely confined to the AFDC cash 
component alone. The benefit-restricting changes incorporated in the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA) also appear to 
have reduced the caseload. With respect to the effects of welfare on the 
increase in female-headed families, recent research (cited in chapter 2) 
suggests that welfare has had a negative effect on marriage and a posi 
tive effect on out-of-wedlock childbearing, although the importance of 
these effects is variable across studies. Because the new legislation will 
reduce the value of going on welfare, we anticipate that it will induce 
reduction in the welfare caseload. The impact may be greater in the 
long run as attitudes of future cohorts of young women may be influ 
enced by the legislation, causing some decline in out-of-wedlock child- 
bearing and increases in marriage and work.
Lessons for Welfare Reform 107
Characteristics of the Welfare Population
The characteristics and behavior patterns of the current welfare pop 
ulation are bound to influence the practical implementation of welfare 
reform by the states. Given a 5-year time limit it becomes important to 
know the number who have exceeded the limit under AFDC and to be 
able to determine, based on skills and other characteristics, which 
recipients are most likely to encounter problems.
As shown in chapter 3, which analyzes the welfare usage of a 
national sample of young women followed over a thirteen-year period, 
there is considerable diversity in recipient behavior. Counting all epi 
sodes on welfare over the thirteen years, we find that more than 40 per 
cent of mothers who ever go on welfare eventually accumulate more 
than five years on the program. But another group seems to stay on 
welfare for relatively short periods—about 30 percent of those who 
went on welfare accumulated less than two years on the program (17 
percent less than one year).
Women who bear their first child out of wedlock and while a teen 
ager have been the subgroup most likely to go on welfare, and to accu 
mulate the longest tenure on AFDC. Our estimates show that among a 
cohort of teenage unwed mothers, half have gone on welfare within the 
first two years of their first birth and eventually more than 80 percent 
have participated. Of those who have gone on welfare, half have stayed 
for more than five years, and 35 percent for more than seven years. 
This subgroup of the AFDC recipient population made up more than 
half of the AFDC caseload in 1996. Since teen unwed mothers on wel 
fare have limited schooling and low cognitive achievement to begin 
with (in part a consequence of their early childbearing) and also 
acquire little work experience while on welfare, they are likely to expe 
rience difficulties supporting themselves and their children with a pri 
vate sector job. They are the most likely group to come up against a 
five-year time limit and therefore will present the greatest problems for 
states seeking to move recipients into jobs.
There is a bright spot in this discouraging picture of teenage unwed 
mothers who go on welfare. A surprising percentage (about half) have 
left welfare for at least two years when observed about a decade after 
their first child's birth. Most work, but marriage appears to be the most
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effective way to attain a higher income. Those who married (53 per 
cent) had a family income of $30,000 (1989 dollars), about three- 
fourths the income of women who bore their first child after marriage 
and never went on welfare. In contrast, those who left welfare but did 
not marry had an average total income of only $14,700.
Nonetheless, welfare participation, regardless of marital status or 
age at first birth, has a detrimental effect on the level of earnings attain 
able. Women who leave welfare have high rates of work participation, 
almost equaling those of women with children who have never been on 
welfare, but the earnings former welfare mothers can command remain 
substantially lower than those of other women. Although their earnings 
rise as they accumulate work experience, their low skills and lost years 
of work while on welfare perpetuate an earnings gap that is likely to be 
difficult to close.
The Effectiveness of Welfare-to-work Programs
Chapter 4 addresses the question: how effective have been alterna 
tive types of programs in raising AFDC women's earnings and in 
reducing caseloads? Evidence is presented from research on three 
genres of programs: employment, education, and training for adult 
women with school-age children; education and other services for 
teenage mothers who were new AFDC recipients; and workfare. 
Results from the JOBS program are discussed in chapter 5.
One important caveat to this review is that the findings refer to pro 
grams implemented in an environment in which there was no limit on 
the time a women could remain on welfare. The conclusions about the 
programs' effectiveness may not necessarily apply to programs oper 
ated under an environment of welfare reform with a five-year lifetime 
limit.
Unfortunately, there is no evidence that any of the large number of 
education, employment, and training programs that have been offered 
or mandated for AFDC recipients since 1967 has had a significant 
impact on the duration of time spent on welfare. Although some pro 
grams have had positive effects on the employment and earnings of 
recipients, these effects have been too small and transitory to move sig-
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nificant numbers of recipients off welfare completely. These discourag 
ing results apply to adult recipients as well as to young women 
enrolled in special programs for teenage AFDC mothers. Whether 
these programs would be more effective if combined with a mandatory 
welfare time-limit remains a question that cannot be answered with 
currently available data.
Workfare, although much discussed, has seldom been tried for sin 
gle mothers on AFDC. Workfare is a program in which welfare recipi 
ents are mandated to perform an assigned job for a specified number of 
hours per week in return for welfare benefits. The empirical evidence 
on its effects is scanty, although one evaluation of such a program tried 
in Ohio did provide some evidence that it reduced the AFDC caseload. 
On theoretical grounds at least (see chapter 4), workfare constitutes a 
promising tool to be tried, particularly for women with school-aged 
children. On philosophical grounds, the idea of working for one's ben 
efit may also help instill appropriate work attitudes among recipients.
In 1994, under the JOBS program, only 9 percent of all adult AFDC 
recipients were enrolled in a training program. The degree to which 
AFDC program administrators targeted AFDC recipients for training 
by assigning them mandatory status was no greater under JOBS than it 
was during the pre-JOBS era in the late 1980s. Since the new welfare 
legislation requires an increase in work activity participation to 25 per 
cent of the adult caseload (rising to 50 percent), a large increase in 
resources could be required over current levels, especially for child 
care services. Such an expansion may not be feasible, at least in a short 
time period.
Prevention Versus Rehabilitation
It has proven to be extraordinarily difficult for any government pro 
gram to transform the subgroup of recipients with multiple problems 
into workers who can earn a high enough income to support a family 
on their own and compete with the benefit offered to welfare recipients. 
Changes in incentives may improve the success rate of some traditional 
programs. But it is likely that a core group will continue to be difficult 
to reach.
110 Summary and Concluding Comments
For this core group it may be more fruitful for states to focus their 
efforts on measures aimed at preventing girls from starting on the path 
to welfare dependence in the first place. Such efforts could include nar 
rowly targeted programs, such as teen pregnancy prevention programs 
and targeted employment programs. Unfortunately, the results of many 
such programs have not been very encouraging. 1 One of the exceptions 
is the JOB START program which while a training program appears to 
have reduced the probability of a first pregnancy and subsequent 
AFDC participation among teenage girls.
The fact of the matter, however, is that it has proven difficult for nar 
rowly focused, short duration programs, such as the teen pregnancy 
prevention programs, to overcome the handicaps that often arise from 
growing up in a disadvantaged family and neighborhood. 2 Because of 
these larger conditioning factors it is important to turn to more funda 
mental institutions in our society to improve the upward mobility of 
disadvantaged groups.
School may be the institution best suited for addressing the prob 
lems underlying the skill deficiencies and attitudinal problems associ 
ated with welfare dependency. It is true that the performance of our 
schools, particularly those in poor and troubled neighborhoods, has 
been a long standing concern. In many cities, however, efforts are 
underway to provide new kinds of schooling opportunities for disad 
vantaged children, including special schools within the public school 
system, charter schools, publicly funded vouchers and privately funded 
scholarships. The ability to choose schooling alternatives, and features 
of the alternatives themselves, may encourage parents to become more 
involved in their children's development, a factor that is often lacking.
Moreover, the declining accessibility of welfare may give parents 
and their teenage children new incentives to utilize the schools if they 
are perceived as a way to improve incomes off welfare. It is hoped that 
the outcome of these efforts will be not only to raise academic perfor 
mance but also to impart a positive influence on social attitudes and 
aspirations. Improvements in schooling opportunities, therefore, may 
in the long run help forestall the early childbearing and other behavior 
that often leads to future welfare dependence.
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NOTES
1. See the review article on adolescent pregnancy prevention program by Moore et al. (1995).
2. Hill and O'Neill (1993) find a strong association between family and neighborhood charac 
teristics while growing up and the likelihood of an out-of-wedlock birth and long-term welfare 
dependence.

Appendix A
Current Population Survey (CPS) and Caseload Measures 
of the Size of the AFDC Caseload
As illustrated in table A-l, major data sources do not agree on the overall 
number of AFDC families. The Current Population Survey (CPS) counts fewer 
families on welfare each year than the caseload data. Moreover, the difference 
between the AFDC BASIC caseload (total recipient units minus unemployed 
parent cases) and the CPS count of female-headed AFDC families widened be 
tween 1987 and 1992 when the CPS shows only two-thirds as many families 
as the caseload data.
Part of the discrepancy between the CPS and caseload measures arises be 
cause of differences in definition. The basic caseload data include a wider array 
of family types than the CPS series, which can be more cleanly restricted to fe 
male-headed families with children (no spouse present in the household). The 
AFDC caseload data, for example, contain cases without an adult recipient (al 
though a caretaker adult is presumably present) and these no adult cases in 
creased by 346,000 between 1987 and 1992—a 74 percent increase (column 3 
of table A-l). 1 In 1992, no adult units accounted for close to half of the differ 
ence between the CPS and caseload measures of recipient families.
Insight into factors that might be responsible for the remaining CPS under- 
count is provided in a special study reported by Goudreau, Oberheu and Den- 
ton (1984) in which respondents to a follow-up survey conducted by the 
Census Bureau were matched with AFDC caseload records in several states. 
The study indicates that nonreporting of AFDC receipt to the Census Bureau 
was three times higher for those who were shown to have received benefits for 
a portion of the year compared to those receiving benefits throughout the peri 
od. A higher level of welfare nonreporting was also found for workers com 
pared to nonworkers, and for married compared to nonmarried individuals. In 
all, it appears that the CPS may not seriously underreport the number of recip 
ients who would be the primary targets for employment and training programs 
under welfare reform, since it is the transitory, short-term participants who are 
most likely to be missed by the CPS surveys.
We have also compared the size of the welfare population as measured by 
the CPS with that measured by the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY), which is a very detailed survey with responses of relatively high qual 
ity and accuracy. Tables A-2 and A-3 show the results of this comparison. In 
table A-2, women ages 21-28 in 1986 are drawn from the CPS sample to cor 
respond with the age range available in the NLSY cohort. (Table A-3 does the
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same for 1990 when the NLSY cohort was ages 25-32.) The female population 
counted by the CPS is larger than the NLSY population because the latter is a 
fixed cohort that can only diminish in size over time, while the CPS reflects a 
population expanded by immigrants who entered the country in large numbers 
during the 1980s, particularly in the age groups shown.
Despite differences in the construction of the two surveys, which can influ 
ence the identification of mother-child families, the two surveys depict approx 
imately the same patterns for the cohorts examined.2 The number of 
nonmarried mothers receiving welfare was about 940,000 in 1989 in the age 
group 25-32 years of age. This is a slightly lower number of recipients than was 
observed for this cohort in 1985 when they were ages 21-28; but since many 
more women became mothers over the four-year period these numbers also re 
flect a substantial decline in the rate of AFDC participation among single 
mothers as age increases. As women move into their late twenties and early 
thirties, a larger proportion of nonmarried mothers are divorced or separated 
and these women have considerably lower rates of welfare participation than 
women who bore their children out-of-wedlock.
It should be noted that the CPS measure of recipients is larger when receipt 
of other welfare benefits is counted as AFDC benefits. This more inclusive 
measure is likely to be more nearly the correct one. According to Goudreau, 
Oberheu and Vaughn (1984), a portion of the CPS undercount of welfare re 
ceipt is attributable to failure of the respondent to identify welfare benefits as 
AFDC when in fact that is what they are. We therefore have used the more in 
clusive definition in tables based on CPS data.
NOTES
1. As discussed in chapter 3, the passage of IRCA is believed to have made it easier for for 
merly illegal aliens to claim AFDC benefits for their children, although they themselves were 
given a five-year waiting period to qualify.
2. The CPS samples households, while the NLSY samples individuals. Until recently the CPS 
did not provide adequate information to correctly identify nonmarried mothers, if these mothers 
were heads of subfamilies rather than heads of primary families.
Table A.I Comparison of CPS and Caseload Estimates of Single-Parent Families on AFDC, 1987-1992 
(population in thousands)
CPS data
Female-headed 
families on 
Year AFDC
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
Percentage increase
1987-92
1989-92
(1)
2,578
2,542
2,373
2,712
2,938
3,003
16.5
26.5
BASIC 
caseload, all 
families minus 
unemployed 
fathers
(2)
3,548
3,538
3,578
3,770
4,107
4,447
24.3
25.3
AFDC caseload data
Units with 
"no adult" 
recipients
(3)
361
359
407
455
558
707
73.7
95.8
BASIC minus 
"no adult" units
(2-3)
(4)
3,187
3,179
3,178
3,315
3,549
3,740
17.4
17.7
Families with 
one adult 
recipient
(5)
3,044
3,045
3,076
3,198
3,483
3,691
21.3
20.0
Total female 
adult recipients
(6)
3,344
3,319
3,285
3,437
3,712
3,931
17.6
19.7
COURCE: CPS data are from public use tapes of the Current Population Survey of March of the following year; AFDC caseload data are from the Office 
of Family Assistance, U.S. Department of Health and human Services. 
NOTE: CPS data refer to the calendar year and caseload data to the fiscal year.
Table A.2 Comparison of AFDC Recipients in 1985 NLSY and CPS (Women Ages 21-28 in 1986)
Women with children
NLSY, 1985
Married
Never married
Other nonmarried
Total nonmarried
CPS, 1985
Married
Never married
Other nonmarried
Total nonmarried
All women
(OOOs)
7,776
6,424
1,869
8,293
8,352
6,954
1,712
8,669
(OOOs)
5,239
1,165
1,157
2,322
5,478
1,054
1,060
2,114
Percent of all
women
67.4
18.1
61.9
28.0
65.6
15.2
61.8
24.4
AFDC recipients
(OOOs)
229
576
380
956
173
565
361
926
Percent of
mothers
4.4
49.4
32.8
41.2
3.2
53.6
34.1
43.8
Recipients of AFDC and 
other welfare
(OOOs)
NA
NA
NA
NA
221
619
378
997
Percent of
mothers
4.0
58.7
35.7
47.2
SOURCE: CPS data, see table A.I; NLSY data, NLSY microfiles.
Table A.3 Comparison of AFDC Recipients in 1989 NLSY and CPS (Women Ages 25-32 in 1990)
Women with children
NLSY, 1989
Married
Never married
Other nonmarried
Total nonmarried
CPS, 1985
Married
Never married
Other nonmarried
Total nonmarried
All women
(OOOs)
9,505
3,780
2,653
6,433
10,412
4,516
2,452
6,968
(OOOs)
7,184
1,039
1,835
2,874
7,768
1,054
1,668
2,722
Percent of all 
women
75.6
27.5
69.2
44.7
74.6
23.3
68.0
39.1
AFDC recipients
(OOOs)
178
443
498
941
167
462
444
906
Percent of 
mothers
2.5
42.6
27.1
32.7
2.1
43.8
26.6
33.3
Recipients of AFDC and 
other welfare
(OOOs)
NA
NA
NA
NA
195
475
469
944
Percent of 
mothers
2.5
45.1
28.1
34.7
SOURCE: CPS data, see table A.I; NLSY data, NLSY microfiles.

Appendix B
Table B.I Characteristics, Skills and Work Experience
of 22-29-Year-Old Women on AFDC in 1987, by Years 
on Welfare Since 1978 (NLSY)
All women 
on AFDC 
in 1987
Percent Black
Percent Hispanic
Percent White
Percent teen at first 
birth
Percent out-of-wedlock 
first birth
Percent southern
Number of children:
in year entered AFDC
in 1988
Percent high school 
dropout:
in year went on AFDC
in 1988
AFQT percentile 
(mean)
Percent went on AFDC 
within 2 years of first 
birth
Percent worked before 
AFDC
Weeks worked by 
working women before 
going on AFDC
41.1
10.5
48.4
56.6
61.6
24.9
1.39
2.12
47.5
32.9
27.1
45.5
75.2
120
On AFDC
2 years 
or less
31.2
7.3
61.5
38.5
40.3
27.0
1.55
1.85
22.7
18.6
34.0
29.8
95.5
179
On AFDC 
more than 
2 years
46.9
10.9
42.2
65.5
70.6
23.8
1.31
2.26
52.7
38.0
24.5
57.4
73.9
75.0
On AFDC 
4 years or 
more
52.1
12.1
35.8
73.6
75.9
22.7
1.32
2.36
57:5
50.1
22.6
59.6
65.6
59.8
(continued)
119
120
Table B.I (continued)
Total months on AFDC 
(mean)
Sample size
Weighted population 
(thousands)
All women 
on AFDC 
in 1987
48.1
570
1,050
On AFDC
2 years 
or less
134
328
On AFDC 
more than 
2 years
392
723
On AFDC 
4 years or 
more
291
506
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